Operational risk assessment for shipping in Arctic waters by Khan, Bushra
 
 
Operational r isk assessment for 
shipping in Arctic waters  
by  
© Bushra Khan  
A thesis submitted to the School of Graduate Studies in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
 
Ph.D. in Oil and Gas Engineering, Faculty of Engineering and 
Applied Science  
 
 




May 2020  




Arctic navigation has many complexities due to its particular features such as ice, 
severe weather conditions, remoteness, low temperatures, lack of crew experience, 
and extended period of darkness or daylight. For these  reasons, vessels,  such as oil 
tankers, dry cargo ships, offshore supply vessels, research vessels, and passenger 
ships operating in the Arctic waters may pose a high risk of collision with ice and 
other ships causing human casualties, environmental pollution and the loss of assets.   
This thesis presents a conceptual framework that is focused on collision modelling. 
In order to understand the process of risk escalation and to attempt a proactive 
approach in constituting the collision models for Arctic navigation, the present thesis 
identifies various risk factors that are involved in a collision. Furthermore, the thesis 
proposes the probabilistic framework tools that are based on the identified risk factors 
to estimate the risks of collision in the Artic. The proposed frameworks are used to 
model the collision based risk scenarios in the region. They are developed with the 
use of Bayesian Networks, the Nagel-Schreckenberg (NaSch), and Human Factor 
Analysis and Classification (HFACS) models.  In the present thesis, the proposed 
models are theoretical in nature, but they can be useful in developing a collision 
monitoring system that provides a real time-estimate of collision probability that 
could help avoid collisions in the Arctic. Further, the estimated probabilities are also 




The proposed frameworks simplifies maritime accident modeling by developing a 
practical understanding of the role of physical environment, navigational and 
operational related aspects of ships, and human errors, such as individual lapses, 
management failures, organizational failures, and economic factors in the collision 
related accidents in the Arctic.   
This research also identifies the macroscopic properties of maritime traffic flow and 
demonstrates how these properties influence collision properties. The thesis also 
presents an innovative accident model for ice-covered waters that estimates the 
collision probability and establishes the relationship between the macroscopic 
properties of the traffic flow with the contributory accidental risk factors in the region.  
The main focus of the present thesis is, to better understand, communicate, and 
incorporate specific risk factors into the maritime risk assessment processes,  involve 
shipping organizations to agree on best practice methodologies and make the data 
sources easily available, and modify the Arctic risk management processes by 
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Chapter 1  
Introduct ion ,  overview, and co-
authorship  sta tement  
1.1 Problem statement  
Icy waters and extreme weather conditions such as long cold winters, short cool 
summers, poor visibility, strong winds, snowstorms, and long polar nights of the 
Arctic cause high-risk potential for a range of marine accidents in the region.  Vessels 
operating in the Arctic are at risk of collision with ice or another vessel, causing 
damage, that vary from a minor hull deformation to ruptures. These damages could 
put lives,  assets , and the environment at significant risk. Independent navigation in 
the Arctic is  only possible during summers, which typically lasts for three to three 
and a half months.  Icebreaker assistance is used for transportation in the remaining 
months.  
The Arctic Climate Assessment  (Hassol, 2004)  states that the extent and the amount 
of ice in the Arctic region are decreasing. Also, due to the growing interest in marine 
resources in the Arctic such as fisheries, hydrocarbons, minerals, and tourism, and the 
potential for new shipping routes through the Arctic from Asia to Europe and North 
America, the opportunities for maritime activities in the Arctic are increasing (Eguíluz 
et al., 2016). Consequently, due to the limited experience of ship operators 
transporting in the Arctic (Smith, 2019a), the future  may see an increase in the 
potential of ship accidents in the region and its impact on the environment. 
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This thesis focuses on accident prevention in Arctic waters. Accident prevention in 
the risk framework can be improved by reducing  the accident probabilities.  
Consequently, risks related to vessels navigating in the Arctic  environment are also 
reduced (Smith, 2019b). There are many factors such as ship design, human factors, 
organizational factors, environmental factors, and management practices and policies, 
that  can increase accident prevention in the Arctic. The main goal of this thesis is to 
address the risk factors that are related to ship accidents such as ship-ice and ship-
ship/icebreaker collision in the Arctic, and to develop  risk assessment models to 
assess the risk of collision in the region. These models are helpful in reducing the 
likelihood of accidents and increase the accident prevention element in the region. 
1.2 Overview of shipping safety and risk assessment  
Risk can be recognized as the possibility of damage associated with an activity or the 
likelihood of the occurrence of an incident that could result in danger to life, property, 
and environment or could lead to commercial or legal disputes.  The term risk 
assessment is different for different professionals, for example, in business, a 
professional manager will assess the risk and take safety precautions at all levels of 
business, which include the assessment and management of financial and commercial 
risks and the obtaining of insurance. Likewise, to a safety and quality assurance 
manager, risk assessment is the application of a systematic approach to hazards:  (1) 
identification of hazards, (2) risk assessment i.e. evaluation of risks associated with 
the hazards, (c) evaluation of the likelihood of hazards and the magnitude of the 
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possible consequences, (d) risk control options, and (e) Analysis of the effectiveness 
of control options (Wadhwa, 2017). Wadhwa (2017) also emphasized that a company 
with a good safety culture  should aim for transparency of management and 
operational practices, and the minimization of known risks. The author further 
described that safety culture in any organization can be enhanced by regular audits, 
risk assessments and evaluations, and the implementation of plans that can control 
risk.  
 Safety in the shipping industry has been shaped through learning from accidents. A 
well-known example of this is the Exon Valdez oil spill. The extreme consequences 
that can arise from oil spills were better understood after this accident.   Shipping 
regulators then decided to make double hull construction compulsory for all oil 
tankers. The double hull  acts as an additional barrier between the punctured hull and 
an oil spill. In order to achieve  safety in shipping, researchers usually evaluate risk 
factors for shipping accidents, conduct risk assessment studies, draw general 
conclusion about the risk, and adopt different techniques to lower  the probability of 
accidents or to lower  the probability of related consequences, or sometimes to lower  
both. For instance, Smith et al. (2015) in their study, presented a model that describes 
Arctic shipping accidents and their causation factors. The model identifies that an 
ability to intervene is an important element to reduce the probability of an accident 
and its severity. It identifies four factors i.e. external, organizational, direct , and 
operational that can influence Arctic shipping accidents, and three types of 
consequences: near misses, incidents, and accidents. The authors used the case studies 
of the Kolskaya and Kulluk accidents to explain their model. Similarly, (Kum & 
Sahin, 2015) proposed  recommendations to reduce the occurrence probabilities of 
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accidents e.g. collisions and groundings in the Arctic by applying the Fuzzy Fault 
Tree (FFT) analysis.  Emergency preparedness also plays an important role in 
lessening the probability of consequences of accidents.  
1.2.1 Quantitative risk assessment and Bayesian Network modeling 
A quantitative risk assessment (QRA) is an effective tool to capture a broad picture 
of risk of accidents, as (a) in QRAs risk is usually described in terms of probabilities 
and expected values of hazards and, (b) it has the ability to treat uncertainties related 
to the risk obtained for the desired event (Flage and Aven 2009).  Montewka et al. 
(2014) use the QRA approach to develop a proactive framework for estimating the 
risk of maritime transportation in the Gulf of Finland. The study focuses on ship-ship 
collision in an open sea involving RoPax vessels. The authors adopt Bayesian 
Network (BN) as a tool to model collision risk and quantify uncertainties of the 
model. Khakzad et al. (2013) in their study stated that BNs are preferred for their 
ability to model human and organizational factors, to model common causes of 
accidents, to evaluate  risk control options (Mazaheri et al., 2014), and to evaluate 
mitigation measures. The application of the BNs has also been proposed to the IMO 
for the third step of Formal Safety Assessment (FSA), which is the risk control options 
(Hänninen et al. 2009). BNs have been used to examine many accident scenarios in 
the maritime domain, for instance,  
• Khan et al. (2014) propose a cause-consequence based model using  BNs. 
They estimate the probability of maritime accidents and their related 
consequences during navigation in Arctic waters. Zhang (2014) also concludes 
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that BNs are beneficial to deal with uncertainties in maritime risk assessments 
because they can combine objective data with subjective knowledge.  
• Zeng et al. (2014) indicate that the BN model can effectively address the 
problem of data deficiency and mutual dependency of incidents in risk 
analysis. It can also model the development process of unexpected hazards 
and provide decision support for risk mitigation.   
• Fu et al. (2016) considered hydro-meteorological parameters, such as wind 
speed, air temperature, visibility, sea temperature, ice concentration, ice 
thickness, and wave height, and ship performance parameters, such as ship 
speed, and engine power, as risk influencing factors for Arctic navigation. By 
taking said influencing parameters as an input, the authors applied a BN to 
predict the probability of ship besetting in ice along the analyzed route. The 
results of the study suggested prior judgments of safety and sailing conditions 
are necessary for ice-going ships before sailing in Arctic waters.  
• Baksh et al. (2018) have used BN to investigate the possibility of marine 
accidents, such as collision, foundering, and grounding along the Northern Sea 
Route (NSR). In the proposed risk model, the different operational and 
environmental factors are considered as the factors that affect shipping 
operations in the NSR. The authors have demonstrated the application of the 
model by taking a case study of an oil-tanker navigating the NSR. The case 
study indicated that collision, grounding, and foundering probabilities are high 
in the East Siberian Sea. The model suggested that the ice effect is a dominant 
factor in accident causation in the NSR. 
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• Zhang and Thai (2016) discussed some of the basic reasons to choose BNs for 
modeling maritime accidents, i.e. a clear presentation of causal relationships, 
making both forward and backward inferences, a combination of both experts’ 
judgments and experimental data, its power to deal with uncertainty, and 
making updates with new information and observations. However, the 
difficulty in collecting the experts’ opinions is one of the common challenges 
that researchers could have faced while using BNs for modeling maritime 
accidents. 
Some researchers have investigated various human errors in marine accidents and 
linked them with the risk assessment studies, for instance,   
• Hänninen and Kujala (2010) estimated the effect of the role of human factors 
in ship collision by means of BN. They consider data from the Gulf of Finland 
and identify the most plausible human factors affecting the BN.  
• Hänninen et al. (2014) linked safety management to maritime traffic safety 
indicated by accident involvement, incidents reported by Vessel Traffic 
Service, and the results from Port State Control inspections. They use BN and 
the model parameters are based on expert elicitation and learning from 
historical data. 
• Trucco et al. (2008) presented an innovative approach to integrating human 
and organizational factors into risk analysis. A BN is developed to model the 
Maritime Transport System (MTS) by considering its different actors (ship-
owner, shipyard, port, and regulator) and their mutual influences. Conditional 
probabilities are estimated by means of experts’ judgments collected from an 
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international panel. Finally, a sensitivity analysis is carried out to identify 
configurations of the MTS leading to a significant reduction of accident 
probability during the operation of a high-speed craft. 
Though BN is identified as a useful and robust tool to model marine accidents, it does 
not account for the time dependence. To overcome this limitation of BN, dynamic BN 
(DBN) has been used in some accident modeling. DBN is a special form of BN that 
models the dynamics of the system by considering time. DBNs are the probabilistic 
graphical models that are used to describe the uncertainties of diverse situations. They 
can reduce the computational complexities, predict complex phenomena, and provide 
support to decision making in the scenario where data is not clear and variables are 
highly interlinked (Sarshar et al.  2013). Cai et al. (2013) used DBNs to assess the 
risk of human factors on offshore blowout and (Sarshar et al.  2013) used DBNs to 
model passengers’ panic during a ship fire.  
1.3 Ice navigation, convoy operations, ship domain, and 
Nagel-Schrekenberg (NaSch) model 
1.3.1 Ice navigation: ship-ice collision 
Ice is an obstacle to any ship,  even an ice breaker (Canadian Coast Guard, 2012a). 
Therefore, before entering an ice zone, the Master should try to identify the ice 
conditions in a suitable period of time so that the vessel’s speed can be adjusted 
accordingly and the further passages/routes can be chosen carefully based on the 
aware situations (House et al. 2016).  
8 | P a g e  
 
In general ice strength is dependent on many factors, for instance, types (age and 
deformation) of ice, thickness, temperature, porosity, salinity, density. The ice 
thickness and types are important factors of ship-ice collision during ice navigation. 
Kubat and Timco (2003) in their study, investigated 125 events of vessel damage in 
the Canadian Arctic and determined that most of the vessels were damaged due to the 
presence of multiyear ice.  Similarly, Canadian Coast Guard (2012)  and American 
Bureau of Shipping (ABS) advisory (2014) also stated that presence of thick first-
year ice, old ice (second year and multiyear), ice floes, level ice, deforming sea ice, 
i.e., rafted ice, ridges, rubbles, and hummocks are hazardous for ice navigation. Pieces 
of floating ice/icebergs or other drifting ice features are also threating for ships 
navigating in ice-covered waters. To avoid the ice hazards, the effectiveness of radar 
and radio communications (between ship to regulating authority) is important for safe 
ice navigation (Canadian Coast Guard 2012; ABS advisory 2014). In addition to this, 
navigational lights, searchlights, and ice charts also contribute to avoiding such 
hazards (Canadian Coast Guard, 2012a). 
1.3.2 Route planning and effective safety measures for safe ice 
navigation 
Route planning and safety measures also contribute to safe ice navigation.  Route 
planning in Canada is guided and controlled by the Arctic Ice Regime Shipping System 
(AIRSS). AIRSS is a regulatory standard that provides a formula to calculate Ice 
Numerals for different ice cover.  Ice Numerals are based on the known ice conditions 
of the region and the ice class of the vessel (Østreng et al., 2013).  For the NSR, 
routing of the merchant's vessels is usually governed by icebreaker escort (ABS 
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advisory, 2014). IMO has recently introduced the Polar Operational Limit Assessment 
Risk Indexing System (POLARIS) to guide decision-making related to route selection 
in Polar waters. POLARIS assesses the ice conditions based on a Risk Index Outcome 
(RIO) that can be calculated as follows: 
 𝑅𝐼𝑂 = (𝐶𝑜𝑛1× 𝑅𝑉1 ) + (𝐶𝑜𝑛2× 𝑅𝑉2 ) + (𝐶𝑜𝑛3× 𝑅𝑉3 ) + (𝐶𝑜𝑛4× 𝑅𝑉4) (1.1) 
where, Con1, Con2, Con3, and Con4 are the concentrations of ice types, and RV1, RV2, 
RV3, and RV4 are the corresponding risk index values for a give ice class. RVs are 
functions of ice-class, seasons, and operational state (independent navigation or 
icebreaker assistance). Positive RIO suggests an acceptable risk level where 
operations can proceed, while negative RIO suggests unacceptable risk levels where 
operations should not proceed (ABS advisory, 2016). For effective safety measures, 
it is required that a crew be fully aware of the risks of operating the vessels in ice 
infested waters, and with the emergency systems. Masters and officers should be fully 
aware of the limitations of the vessel, on the basis of which they can relate the 
capabilities of the vessel with the ice conditions (ABS advisory, 2009). It is mandatory 
that all the ice navigators onboard carry an operating manual and training manual 
concerning the effective safety at sea (Østreng et al., 2013). 
1.3.3 Convoy operations: ship-ship/icebreaker collisions 
Independent safe navigation in ice becomes difficult in winter, therefore, icebreaker 
assistance is sometimes necessary to help merchant vessels sailing through ice-
covered waters. Goerlandt et al. (2017) discussed five practical operations with 
icebreaker assistance: (1) escorting, in which an icebreaker breaks a channel and a 
vessel follows the icebreaker at a  distance, (2) breaking loose operations, in which 
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icebreaker passes a ship that is beset in ice and breaks the ice at the sides and in front 
of the assisted ship, (3) convoy operations, are similar to escorting, however, in this 
case, several ships follow the icebreaker, (4) double convoy operations, in which one 
icebreaker moves a little ahead of the other icebreaker, to facilitate a vessel with a 
larger breadth than the icebreakers, and (5) towing operations, in which the assisted 
vessel is towed by  the icebreaker because the channel has too much slush ice or  the 
ice pressure makes the channel close too quickly.  
Ship accidents occur more frequently in ice conditions than in open water (Goerlandt, 
Montewka, et al., 2017). Recent risk analysis studies suggested that during icebreaker 
operations, convoy operations are among the most hazardous situations in the 
wintertime conditions i.e. collision between the leading ship of a convoy and 
icebreaker and between the ships in a convoy are the most important related risk 
events (Valdez et al. 2015). Although crews in convoy operations are responsible for 
maintaining a safe distance between individual vessels in a convoy, the icebreaker 
crew may also advise the crew of assisted vessels regarding maintaining a safe 
distance between the vessels in a convoy. Compared to independent navigation, 
convoy operations require a highest speed of vessels to ensure efficient movement of 
ships in the convoy. The distance between the vessels in a convoy is important from 
a safety and operational perspective. If the distance between the two ships in a convoy 
is less than the  safe distance, then a collision is more likely to occur, and if the 
distance between  two ships in a convoy is longer than the  safe distance, then the 
following ship may be hampered by the ice and consequently get stuck in ice 
(Goerlandt, Montewka, et al., 2017). 
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1.3.4 Ship domain  
In marine convoy traffic, ships are required to maintain a safe zone between each 
other and between the icebreaker and the leading ship of the convoy, to avoid 
collisions. The required safe zone is known as the ship domain (Liu et al. 2016; Wang 
and Chin 2016; Fujii and Tanaka 1971; Toyoda and Fujii 1971; Wang 2013; 
Pietrzykowski and Uriasz 2009). The ship domain is used to define the safe distance 
between ships (Liu et al.  2010).  According to recent research, the ship domain is 
dynamic (Liu et al. 2016; Wang and Chin 2016; Pietrzykowski and Uriasz 2009), as 
environmental conditions such as harsh weather and ice, velocity and size of ships, 
operational and navigational skills of the operator, and waterway conditions all are 
factors that can affect the size of ship domain (Qi et al. 2017).  
1.3.5 Nagel-Schrekenberg (NaSch) model 
Nagel-Schrekenberg (NaSch) model is a Cellular Automata (CA) model that is used 
to model single lane traffic. In this model, the velocity of the vehicle is gradually 
increased by one unit per time step (Nagel & Schreckenberg, 1992). It is also used to 
model freeway road traffic flow. It provides a basic understanding of traffic flow 
regarding global density, and global flows of the vehicle that help in avoiding 
congestion and collisions in the lanes. Wright (2013), describes the global density ρ 







 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠
 
(1.2) 
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𝐽(𝜌) =  
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑣𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡
 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝𝑠
 
(1.3) 
The NaSch model is capable of incorporating with human behavior, which is a crucial 
factor when modeling traffic networks.  It is a simple probabilistic CA model based 
on rule 184 (Wolfram 1986; Wright 2013). Rule 184 is a one-dimensional binary 
cellular automation rule; it forms the basis of many cellular automation models of 
traffic flow. In this model, particles that represent vehicles move in a single direction. 
Their starting and stopping depend on the vehicles in front of them (Wolfram, 1986). 
The number of particles remains unchanged during the simulation.  The NaSch model 
is for single-lane traffic where vehicles cannot pass each other; there is no overtaking. 
Likewise, with a little updating in rules, the NaSch model can be used in maritime 
traffic flow (Rozkowsaka and Smolarek 2015; Qi, Zheng, and Gang 2017a; Qi, Zheng, 
and Gang 2017b; Liu et al. 2010; Feng 2013).  
1.4 Human error and marine safety  
Since shipping is the cheapest mode of transportation, over 90% of the world’s cargo 
is transported by merchant vessels (Dhillon, 2007). Although modern ships contain 
many automated systems, still they require a significant human element. Humans are 
not hundred percent reliable, and studies have shown that about 75-96% of marine 
casualties are attributed due to some form of human error (Rothblum, 2000). 
According to Rothblum (2000), human errors are generally caused by design, 
environments, and organizations. The author further discussed that the physical 
environment  causes stress and fatigue in crew,  economic pressures can increase the 
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probability of risk-taking, and  organizational factors affect human performance. 
Examples are given here to exemplify human error and the related risk factors in 
marine industry.  
• Herald of Free Enterprise: The accident occurred on 6th March 1987 due to 
the non-closure of the bow door by the assistant bosun who had fallen asleep. 
Consequently, 150 passengers and 38 crew members lost their lives in the 
accident. It was noted during the investigation that a few years earlier, a sister 
ship of the Herald of Free Enterprise, the Pride of Free Enterprise had sailed 
from Dover with all doors open due to the same reason which Herald of Free 
Enterprise had capsized. This shows that the organization  completely failed 
to learn practically from the early incident.  The  careless attitude of the 
organization towards safety had been noticed during the investigation and this 
accident led towards an increased focus on the shipping company’s role in 
accident causation and prevention (Manuel, 2011).  
• Green Lilly: In November 1997, the vessel  sailed into  severe weather and 
grounded off the Shetland Islands. One life was lost, and the ship was a 
complete loss. The investigation report stated that the master did not receive 
any external pressure to sail in bad weather, but he decided to continue his 
journey to avoid delays (Manuel, 2011). The investigation report also stated 
that nobody from the crew openly questioned the master about his decision. 
Manuel (2011) also argued that lack of significant and obvious statements 
from the organization regarding “pressure not to sail” prioritize economy over 
safety.  
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• Bow Mariner: On 28th February 2004, the chemical tanker, Bow Mariner, 
caught fire during its tank-cleaning. The vessel exploded and sank about 45 
nautical miles east of Virginia, USA. The accident led to the deaths of 3 crew 
members, 18 lost, and a  release of cargo ethyl alcohol and fuel. The 
investigation report stated that it was the failure of the operator and the senior 
officers of the vessel, who could not properly implement the company policies 
of vessel safety. The lack of adequate communication and coordination 
between officers and crew members was also noticed during investigation, as 
the master, chief officer, and chief engineer all were Greek, and the remaining 
officers and crew members were Filipinos. It was observed that the chief 
officer, who was also the safety officer and responsible for equipment 
maintenance and training of personnel, had a lack of trust in his juniors. The 
surviving deck crew reported that the chief officer did not train his junior 
officers. Juniors with lack of training and fear of the senior officers could not 
question the master’s  order to open all empty tanks. The crew members either 
did not have an idea about the danger or they were not encouraged to question 
the master’s order (Manuel, 2011).  
• Cruise Ship Norway: On 25th May 2003, the boiler of the cruise ship  ruptured 
resulting in the deaths of 8 crew members. The accident occurred due to 
technical reasons, but the investigation report highlighted that the owners of 
the ship were constantly warned by operators about lapses in the boiler 
maintenance (Manuel, 2011).  
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The errors that are  observed in the above and other accident scenarios can be 
described as (1) Unsafe acts such as judgement failures, inadequate decisions, 
negligence, and inadequate general technical knowledge, (2) preconditions of unsafe 
acts such as poor weather, inadequate communication and coordination between crew 
members of a ship, crew members and the master of a ship, poor maintenance, 
navigational failures and fatigue, (3) unsafe supervision such as failure to continue 
safe operations and inadequate route planning, (4) organizational factors such as 
management practices and lack of training, and (5) external factors such as economic 
pressures and faulty company policies and standards. Human Factor Analysis and 
Classification System-HFACS frameworks (section 1.4.1) have been widely used in 
various industries to understand the role of latent and active errors in accidents. The 
early identification of errors in an organization can help to manage/reduce risks of 
accidents at the early stages.  
1.4.1 Human Factor Analysis and Classification System-HFACS 
Wiegmann and Shappell (2003) introduced HFACS in the aviation industry to analyze 
and classify human errors and mishaps in aviation accidents. An HFACS framework 
is specially developed to define the relevant active and latent failures in Reason’s 
Swiss-cheese model. The model depicts the combination of active failures that are 
made by operators with the existing latent conditions in organizations. Active failures 
are the operator’s actions and decisions that occur just before the accident and are 
often considered the most prominent cause of the accident.  Latent failures are related 
to the organization i.e. decisions, conditions, policies, practices, and management that 
exist within the system for years but have never been associated with an accident or 
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identified as a safety issue until they are overtly examined (Reinach and Viale 2006).  
It contains four layers of risk levels: (1) unsafe acts, (2) precondition for unsafe acts, 
(3) unsafe supervision, and (4) organizational factors together with 19 classifications. 
Reinach and Viale (2006) later proposed a fifth layer called the external factors. 
Authors believed that the economy, law, and policy should also be considered during 
the identification of accident risk factors. According to Zhang et al. (2019), the 
HFACS framework has been convincing for risk assessment studies because the 
factors of each layer can change continuously according to the object of research.  The 
main advantage of HFACS is its use of common terms that apply to a variety of 
industries and activities (Reinach and Viale 2006). HFACS model was originally 
developed for the aviation industry. Since the model is reasonably flexible, minor 
changes can make it useable for other industries, such as marine and rail. The new 
taxonomies can have different names such as HFACS-ATC, for addressing the errors 
of air traffic control (Scarborough and Pounds 2001), CF-HFACS for military 
activities of Canadian Armed Forces (Wiegmann and Shappell 2003), HFACS-RR for 
railway investigation (Reinach and Viale 2006), and HFACS-MA, HFACS-Coll, 
HFACS-Grounding, and HFACS-SIBCI for maritime accidents investigations (Chen 
and Chou 2012; Chauvin et. al 2013; Mazaheri et al. 2015; Zhang et al. 2019). 
Chauvin et al. (2013) are the first who proposed the fifth layer called outside factors 
to HFACS for maritime accident investigations. Later, other authors have also used 
the five-layer HFACS models in their studies to identify the risk factors for maritime 
accidents (Mazaheri et al. 2015; Zhang et al. 2019). 
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1.5 Scope of work and contribution  
One of the main contributions of this thesis is to identify the contributory risk factors 
related to Arctic navigation and develop the probabilistic framework tools to assess 
the risks of collision. Risk factors that have been used in this study are collected from 
previous accidental pieces of literature and case studies. HFACS-MCTAI has also 
been proposed in this study to identify and classify supervisory, organizational, and 
economy-related risk factors to assess the collision risk in the Arctic waters. The 
probabilities obtained from the proposed models can be used to develop an early 
warning system, due to which, vessels may get some time to slow down or divert 
away from the challenging area.   
The proposed thesis is well in line with the Polar Code address i.e. the need for risk 
assessment tools for operations in polar waters. The proposed updated NaSch model 
provides a new perspective on the dynamics-related risk factors for Arctic navigation, 
for instance, risks related to the increased maximum velocities, high deceleration 
probabilities, and the reduced critical densities in the convoy. The integration of the 
updated NaSch model with the BN model simplifies maritime accident modeling by 
developing a practical understanding of the role of macroscopic properties such as, 
maximum velocities, deceleration probabilities, and critical densities of the traffic flow 
in maritime convoys. The integrated model also identifies the main risk factors for 
convoy traffic flow and can be used as a guiding tool to control and minimize the 
navigational and operational risks in the Arctic convoys. 
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The proposed HFACS-MCTAI  framework identifies two new risk factors i.e. crew 
reduction and crew overloaded in its layer of organizational factors that do not 
influence the risk of collision directly but a small increase in the factors greatly 
influences the risk of an accident.  Crew reductions are associated with technology 
implementation that results in the risks of crew overloaded. The crew overload can 
increase the risks of stress, fatigue, and boredom in the crew members, which will 
degrade the safety of the system at sea. The proposed study suggests that shipping 
organizations should understand that ships are sociotechnical systems based on 
technologies, crew members, organizational structures, and an external environment. 
Therefore, innovations in technologies should be accompanied by the appropriate 
training of crew members, organizational innovations, and ergonomic design. These 
approaches help reduce the potential problems of stress, fatigue, and boredom of crew 
members in ships. 
The thesis is written in manuscript format. Four research articles were developed 
during this study. Table 1.1 describes the articles that have been written during this 
research. Table 1.1. also establishes the connection of these articles to the overall 
objectives and associated tasks of this research. 
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Table 1.1. Organization of the thesis. 
Article titles Research objectives Associated Tasks 
Chapter 2: An 
operational risk 




• The research objective of this chapter 
is to construct the ship-ice collision 
model to assess the risk of collision in 
Arctic waters.  
• Identify  risk factors for Arctic navigation 
• Constitute small conceptual component models Object-
Oriented BNs (OOBNs) that are based on identified risk 
factors. 
• The constituted OOBNs form (1) Ship navigational system 
states, (2) Ship operational system states, (3) Weather system 
states, (4) Ice states, and (5) Human error. 
• Integrate all the constituted OOBN models to construct a ship-
ice collision model. 
• Illustrate the model’s utility by examining the day-to-day risk 
of a hypothetical oil tanker navigating from Murmansk to 
China.  
• Discuss the results, perform sensitivity and uncertainty 
analysis. 
Chapter 3: A DBN 
model for ship-ice 
collision risk in the 
Arctic waters 
• The research objective of this 
chapter is to dynamically assess 
the risk of ship-ice collision in 
Arctic waters. 
 
• Identify the dynamic risk factors for Arctic navigation. 
• Construct a conceptual DBN model for Arctic waters based on 
the identified dynamic risk factors. 
• Illustrate the model’s utility by examining the risk of a 
hypothetical oil-tanker navigating on the Barents Sea. 
• Discuss the results. 
Chapter 4: A cellular 
automation model for 
convoy traffic in 
Arctic waters 
• The research objective of this 
paper is to assess the risk of ship-
ship and ship-ice breaker 
• Update Nagel-Schreckenberg (NaSch) model to develop a 
collision accident model for marine convoy traffic in Arctic 
waters.  
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Article titles Research objectives Associated Tasks 
collision in a convoy while 
navigating in Arctic waters. 
• Test the model on Vilkitskii strait and compute the critical 
density of the traffic flow. 
• Integrate the updated NaSch model with BN to develop a 
conceptual risk model in order to assess the risk of ship-
ship/icebreaker collision in a convoy. 
• Discuss the results, perform sensitivity analysis. 
Chapter 5: Integrated 
accident model for 
marine convoy traffic 
in ice-covered waters 
• The research objective of this 
chapter is to develop a conceptual 
accident model for convoy traffic 
in ice-covered waters. 
• Construct HFACS-Marine Convoy Traffic and Accidents in 
Ice-covered waters (HFACS-MCTAI) model. 
• Identify contributing risk factors and classify them on the basis 
of the HFACS-MCTAI model. 
• Develop the cause-consequences relationship between the 
contributory risk factors. 
• Develop a case study of winter navigation of hypothetical 
marine convoy traffic on the St. Lawrence Seaway and estimate 
the accident probabilities of risk factors, also estimate the 
critical density of the flow by using the updated NaSch model 
(developed in Chapter 4) 
• Integrate HFACS-MCTAI with an updated NaSch model using 
BN to develop an Integrated Accident Model (IAM). 
• Estimate the ship-ship/icebreaker collision and ship-ice 
collision probability. 
• Discuss the results, perform sensitivity analysis.  
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1.6 Novelty   
• In this research, the OOBN technique has been employed to model maritime 
accident scenarios. 
• The relationship between the physical environment, navigational and 
operational related aspects of ships and human errors such as individual 
management failures, organizational failures, and economic factors have been 
developed to model the ship-ice and ship-ship/icebreaker collision-based risk 
scenarios. 
• DBN is used to model ship-ice collision.  Until now, no attempts have been 
made to use DBN to model collision accident scenarios.  
• Very few attempts have been made to use the Cellular Automata (CA) 
technique to model maritime accident scenarios. In this research, the CA 
framework is used to model collision risk scenarios in a marine convoy.  
• The CA-based accident model has been integrated with BN to assess the risk 
of ship-ship/icebreaker collision in a convoy.  
• The relationship between macroscopic properties of a convoy flow i.e. 
deceleration probability, maximum velocity, and critical density, and the 
factors for a convoy safety i.e. maintaining a safe distance between 2 ships in 
a convoy, maintaining a safe speed in ice, safe operations in ice, and 
maintaining a safe distance between an icebreaker and the leading ship of a 
convoy, have been developed.  
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•  HFACS-Marine Convoy Traffic and Accidents in Ice-covered waters 
(HFACS-MCTAI) framework has been proposed in this study to classify the 
contributory risk factors for ship-ice and ship-ship/icebreaker collision in a 
convoy.  For the very first time, the cause-consequence relationships between 
the classified contributory risk factors have been developed in this research.  
•  An Integrated Accident Model (IAM) for marine convoy traffic in ice-covered 
waters has been proposed. The model is constructed by integrating the 
HFACS-MCTAI framework with a CA-based accident model through BN. The 
IAM model is innovative. The main purpose of this model is to assess the risk 
of ship-ice and ship-ship/icebreaker collision in a convoy navigating in ice-
covered waters. The IAM also establishes the relationship between the 
contributory accidental risk factors with the macroscopic properties of the 
convoy traffic flow. 
• This research also demonstrates that the macroscopic properties of a convoy 
flow influence the collision probabilities. 
1.7 Co-authorship statement  
The author was responsible for composing this thesis. She conducted the literature 
review and developed all the accident models that are based on BN, OOBN, DBN, 
CA, and HFACS, respectively. The author produced the conceptual accident models 
of ship-ice and ship-ship/icebreaker collisions and tested them by considering case 
studies of oil-tanker or a marine convoy navigating in Northern Sea Route (NSR) and 
the ice-covered waters of North Atlantic Ocean. Conclusions were drawn based on 
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the modeling results and its practical application.  The co-authors Khan and Veitch 
provided feedback on draft versions of the four manuscripts. 
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Chapter 2  
An Operat ional Risk Analysis  Tool to  
Analyze Marine Transpor tat ion in Arct ic  
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Abstract. The Arctic Ocean has drawn major attention in recent years due to its 
rich natural resources and shorter navigational routes. Arctic development and 
transportation involve significant risk caused by the unique features of this region, 
such as ice, severe operating conditions, unpredictable climatic changes, and 
remoteness. Considering the high degree of uncertainty in the performance of vessel 
operating systems and humans, robust risk analysis and management tools are 
required to provide decision-support to prevent accidents and ensure safety at sea. 
This paper proposes an OOBN model to dynamically predict ship-ice collision 
probability based on navigational and operational system states, weather and ice 
conditions, and human error. The model, when integrated with potential 
consequences, may help estimate risk. A case study related to oil tanker navigation 
on the Northern Sea Route (NSR) is used to show the application of the proposed 
model to predict oil tanker collision with sea ice. 
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2.1 Introduction  
Marine transportation is an important service sector to support natural resource 
development and international commerce. Safety and efficiency are two critical 
concerns of the marine industry. The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment report 
(Hassol, 2004) states that the extent and the amount of ice in the Arctic region are 
decreasing. Therefore, forthcoming years may see reduced difficulty for marine 
transportation in Arctic waters. This may increase the potential of ship accidents in 
the region (Borgerson, 2008). 
Navigation safety becomes a more critical issue considering various risk factors such 
as ice, severe operating conditions, unpredictable climatic changes, and remoteness. 
Also, the performance of vessel systems degrades in harsh environments, which 
consequently increases the risk of collision. (F. Khan et al., 2014) identified extremely 
low temperatures, multi-year sea-ice, ice-ridges, and pack-ice as the main causes of 
the increasing potential of ship accidents in the Arctic regions. Marchenko, Borch, 
Markov, and Andreassen (2015) have made similar conclusions. The authors mention 
that mineral exploration, fisheries, tourism, research, and naval operations are 
restricted due to the limited infrastructure, low temperatures, sea ice, icing, and polar 
lows. Human error is another main contributor to accidents (Rothblum, 2000). Li, 
Meng, and Qu (2012) summarize 87 academic research papers and project reports to 
analyze frequency and consequences-based risk estimation models separately. They 
argue that human error is of utmost importance in ship navigation and recommend 
more research in this field. The study by (Goerlandt & Montewka, 2015), discusses 
the scientific definitions and approaches related to maritime risk analysis and show 
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that the probabilistic approach and the approaches based on realism and experiments 
are effective in this field.  
A few recent attempts have been made to develop risk models for Arctic shipping, 
(Sahin & Kum, 2015) present various navigational risk factors in the Arctic ocean, 
determine the numerical weights for each risk factor using a Fuzzy-AHP approach, 
and calculate the risks with numerical probabilistic levels. Risk matrices are used to 
assess frequencies and consequences of grounding, collision (with sea ice and others), 
fire, violence or terror for various cruise ships, cargo, tankers, petroleum installations, 
and fishing boats in the Norwegian and the west Russian Arctic regions (Marchenko 
et al., 2015).  
A quantitative risk assessment (QRA) is an effective tool to capture a broad picture 
of risk of accidents, as (a) in QRAs risk is usually described in terms of probabilities 
and expected values of hazards and, (b) it has the ability to treat uncertainties related 
to the risk obtained for the desired event (Flage & Aven, 2009). Risk has been defined 
as expected value, probability of an undesirable event, uncertainty, potential losses, 
probability and severity of consequences, event or consequences, consequences + 
uncertainty, and effect of uncertainty on objectives (Aven, 2012; Goerlandt & 
Montewka, 2015). Montewka et al. (2014) use the QRA approach to develop a 
proactive framework for estimating the risk of maritime transportation in the Gulf of 
Finland. This study focuses on ship-ship collision in an open sea involving RoPax 
vessels. They adopt Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN) as a tool to model collision risk 
and quantify the uncertainties of the model. To dynamically assess the transportation 
risk, Khan et al. (2014) propose a cause-consequence based model using Bayesian 
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networks (BN). They estimate the probability of maritime accidents and their related 
consequences. Some hindrances to maritime risk assessments, such as missing data 
and fuzziness, are discussed in (D. Zhang, 2014). The author concludes that fuzzy 
logic, analytical hierarchal process (AHP), evidential reasoning (ER) and BNs are 
advantageous to deal with uncertainties because they can combine objective data with 
subjective knowledge. An approach to estimate the effect of the role of human factors 
in ship collision by means of BN is proposed by (Hänninen & Kujala, 2010). They 
consider data from the Gulf of Finland and discover the most plausible human factors 
affecting the BN. Hänninen, Valdez Banda, and Kujala (2014) link safety management 
to maritime traffic safety indicated by accident involvement, incidents reported by 
Vessel Traffic Service, and the results from Port State Control inspections. They use 
BN and the model parameters are based on expert elicitation and learning from 
historical data. An innovative approach to integrating human and organizational 
factors into risk analysis is presented by (Trucco et al., 2008). A BN is developed to 
model the Maritime Transport System (MTS) by considering its different actors (ship-
owner, shipyard, port, and regulator) and their mutual influences. Conditional 
probabilities are estimated by means of experts’ judgments collected from an 
international panel of different European countries. Finally, a sensitivity analysis is 
carried out to identify configurations of the MTS leading to a significant reduction of 
accident probability during the operation of a high-speed craft. The difficulty of risk 
analysis in RoPax transport is dealt by developing a BN that exploits expert surveys 
(Zeng et al., 2017). The results indicate that the BN model can effectively address the 
problem of data deficiency and mutual dependency of incidents in risk analysis. It can 
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also model the development process of unexpected hazards and provide decision 
support for risk mitigation.  
The above discussion indicates the usefulness of BN as an approach to model 
maritime risk. But some limitations with a standard BN representation make it 
difficult to learn, construct, update, infer and reason complex models. In this paper, 
we focus on key risk factors affecting safe navigation in the Arctic waters. Object-
Oriented BN (OOBN) is proposed as an approach to model and analyze ship-ice 
collision accidents due to the following reasons: 
(1) OOBNs are simple to construct, ready for reuse and flexible for modification,  
(2) compared to standard BNs, their structure is less complex for better 
communication and explanation (Koller & Pfeffer, 1997), and 
(3) they provide a modular approach such that evolving complexity in the model is 
effectively represented.  
This paper aims to develop a quantitative risk assessment tool using Object Oriented 
BN to assess the probabilistic risk of ship-ice collision in Arctic waters. The model 
can be integrated with other decision support systems on corrective operational 
interventions. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2.2 gives 
a brief overview of OOBNs, an OOBN based risk assessment methodology for ship-
ice collision is proposed in Section 2.3; Section 2.4 presents an application of the 
proposed model through a case study that uses a hypothetical accident scenario related 
to oil tanker collision with ice along the NSR and discusses the results of a sensitivity 
analysis and the model’s uncertainties. Section 2.5 concludes this study and proposes 
some future research directions. 
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2.2 Object-Oriented Bayesian Networks (OOBNs)  
BNs become inefficient in two conditions:  a) when a network includes so many nodes 
that understanding becomes difficult; and b) when a network includes many similar 
recurrent fragments. In both cases, it is difficult to comprehend the visual 
representation of (BNs). Therefore, in both cases, it is essential to decompose the 
network into smaller component models called OOBNs.  
OOBNs have certain properties that are analogous to object-oriented modeling 
(Fenton & Neil, 2013). They can also be viewed as BNs with some added features 
that make them reusable as part of a larger BN. The most important feature of OOBN 
is its input and output nodes. OOBN follows the basic principles of object-oriented 
modeling, which are an abstraction, inheritance, and encapsulation (Blaha & 
Rumbaugh, 2004). The input/output nodes represent the “external interface” of 
OOBN. OOBN cannot produce more than one output for a single input. Also, they 
have ability to update the prior probabilities based on new information. Loops are not 
allowed; only forward propagation is allowed (Fenton & Neil, 2013).  
In both standard BNs and OOBNs, the basic object is a standard random variable 
(nodes) (Koller & Pfeffer, 1997). A simple object is based on basic variables with 
Boolean, integer, and real type values, sometimes defined as enumerated sets. For 
example, ice strength   {high, medium, low}. A complex object comprises a set of 
attributes where each attribute itself is an object. They are composed of input, 
encapsulated (internal), and output nodes. An input node contains basic or structural 
variables, whereas encapsulated and output nodes are only simple objects. The  
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Table 2.1. Risk factors and their associated OOBNs in the ship-ice collision model  
OOBN Risk factors 
Ship Navigational System States Effective Radio Communication 
 Radar Effectiveness 
 Safe Maneuverability in Ice Covered Waters 
 Use of Navigational lights and Search lights 
 Ice Charts 
Ship Operational System States Effective Route Planning 
 Effective Safety Measures 
 Safe Operations in Ice 
 Season 
 Ship Class 
 Speed 
Weather System States Blowing Snow 
 Fog 
 Long Polar Nights 
 Visibility 
 High Winds 
 Seasons 
Ice States Ice Thickness 
 Ice Types 
 Ice Strength 
 Pieces of Floating Ice/ Icebergs 
 Drifting Ice 
Human Error Inadequate Technical Knowledge 
 Inadequate Knowledge of own Ship System 
 Decision based on Inadequate Information 
 Inadequate Communication 
 Fatigue 
 
OOBNs presented here are all complex objects made up of input, encapsulated, and 
output nodes (see section 2.3.2). 
2.3 The proposed methodology  
Figure 2.1 presents the general framework of the proposed model. In the following 
sections, the main component of the proposed framework is discussed in detail. 
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2.3.1 Identification of main risk factors 
The extreme weather conditions of the Arctic, along with the severe ice states, are 
unique environmental risk factors that may potentially cause accidental ship-ice 
collisions during vessel operation in the region. Other risk factors are related to   
Identify risk factors
Constitute OOBNs of 
different states being 




Compute the risk of ship-






Compute the probabilities 
of risk factors
Compute the failure 
probabilities of the states
yes
 
Figure 2.1. General framework of (OOBN) framework. 
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the vessel itself, such as ship navigational and operational systems. Human error is 
often a critical cause of a ship collision accident (Rothblum, 2000). Table 2.1 
summarizes the risk factors for ship-ice collision accidents in Arctic waters. They 
were collected from various studies (ABS advisory, 2009, 2014; Bowditch, 2002; 
Canadian Coast Guard, 2012a; Environment-Canada, 2016; Rothblum, 2000; Sahin 
& Kum, 2015). 
2.3.2 Construction of the OOBNs 
Risk factors in Table 2.1 constitute small component models that are OOBNs: (a) Ship 
Navigational System States, (b) Ship Operational System States, (c) Weather States, 
(d) Ice states, and (e) Human Error (see Figures 2.2 to 2.6). The constituted OOBNs 
combine largely to constitute the (f) Ship- Ice Collision model in which all the output 
nodes of the preceding OOBNs turn into the input nodes (see Figure 2.7). The 
following explains the dependency among the nodes in the proposed OOBNs. 
2.3.2.1 SHIP NAVIGATIONAL SYSTEM STATES 
The effectiveness of radar and radio communications between ship to ship, ship to ice 
breakers and ship/icebreaker to regulating authority is important for safe 
maneuverability in ice-covered waters (ABS advisory, 2014; Canadian Coast Guard, 






Figure 2.2. OOBN for Ship Navigational System States 
 
 





















Figure 2.7. Ship-Ice Collision model. 
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(1) The internal node Safe Maneuverability in Ice Covered Waters is dependent 
on the input nodes: Radar Effectiveness and Effective Radio Communication 
(see Figure 2.2).  
(2) The internal node also derives the output node, i.e., the Ship Navigational 
System States (see Figure 2.2). 
(3)  In addition to radar effectiveness and effective radio communication, 
navigational lights, search lights, and ice charts also contribute to safe ice 
navigation (Canadian Coast Guard, 2012a), therefore, the Ship Navigational 
System States is also dependent on another set of inputs defined by the nodes 
Use of Navigational Lights and Search Lights and Ice Charts (see Figure 2.2).  
The node Ship Navigational System States is a Boolean node that takes values from 
the set {adequate, inadequate}. 
2.3.2.2 SHIP OPERATIONAL SYSTEM STATES 
Route planning and safety measures make up the Safe Operations in Ice node.  Route 
planning in Canada is guided and controlled by the Arctic Ice Regime Shipping System 
(AIRSS). AIRSS is a regulatory standard that provides a formula to calculate Ice 
Numerals for different ice zones in the Canadian Arctic.  Ice Numerals are based on 
the known ice conditions of the region and the ice classification of the vessel (Østreng 
et al., 2013). For the NSR, the routing of the merchant's vessels is usually governed 
by icebreaker escort (ABS advisory, 2014). IMO has recently introduced the Polar 
Operational Limit Assessment Risk Indexing System (POLARIS) to guide decision-
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making related to route selection in Polar waters. POLARIS assesses the ice conditions 
based on a Risk Index Outcome (RIO) that can be calculated as follows: 
 𝑅𝐼𝑂 = (𝐶𝑜𝑛1× 𝑅𝑉1 ) + (𝐶𝑜𝑛2× 𝑅𝑉2 ) + (𝐶𝑜𝑛3× 𝑅𝑉3 )
+ (𝐶𝑜𝑛4× 𝑅𝑉4) 
(2.1) 
where, Con1, Con2, Con3, and Con4 are the concentrations of ice types, and RV1, RV2, 
RV3, and RV4 are the corresponding risk index values for a give ice class. RVs are 
functions of ice-class, seasons, and operational state (independent navigation or 
icebreaker assistance). Positive RIO suggests acceptable risk level where operations 
can proceed, while negative RIO suggests unacceptable risk levels where operations 
should not proceed (ABS advisory, 2016). 
 For effective safety measures, it is required that a crew be fully aware of the risks of 
operating the vessels in ice infested waters, and with the emergency systems. Masters 
and officers should be fully aware of the limitations of the vessel, on the basis of 
which they can relate the capabilities of the vessel with the ice conditions (ABS 
advisory, 2009). It is mandatory that all the ice navigators onboard carry an operating 
manual and training manual concerning the effective safety at sea (Østreng et al., 
2013). IMO has implemented the International Code for Ships Operating in Polar 
Waters (Polar Code) which came into force in January 2017. The Polar Code deals 
with ship design, construction, and equipment, operational and training issues, search 




Considering the factors Effective Route Planning, Effective Safety Measures, Safe 
Operations in Ice, Seasons, Speed, and Ship Class, the conditional probability tables 
in current OOBN model are constructed as follows:  
(1) The internal node Safe Operations in Ice is dependent on Effective Safety 
Measures, and Effective Route Planning. 
(2) Ship Class is dependent on Seasons 
(3) The internal node also derives the output node Ship Operational System States 
which is dependent on Speed, and Ship Class. 
Figure 2.3 shows a model of Ship Operational System States. The output node is a 
Boolean node with possible values from the set {good, poor}. 
2.3.2.3 WEATHER STATES 
Since, blowing snow, fog and long polar nights are the main factors to reduce visibility 
in the Arctic waters (Canadian Coast Guard, 2012a), we develop the OOBN model 
(see Figure 2.4) by keeping the Visibility as an internal node, the conditional 
probability tables in current OOBN model are constructed as follows:  
(1) The internal node Visibility is dependent on the inputs  Blowing Snow, Fog, and  
Long Polar Nights (see Figure 2.4).  
(2) Later, the output node Weather States becomes dependent on the node Visibility 
in the model.  
(3) The output node is also dependent on the inputs High Winds and the Season.  
High winds are the principal factor of drifting ice and ice deformation at sea i.e. 
Rafting, Ridging, and hammocking, while Seasons have their own impacts on the 
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weather e.g. the Arctic faces extremely rough weather in winter, mild in 
summer/spring and relatively harsh in Autumn. The output node takes values from the 
set {rough, normal, good}.  
2.3.2.4 ICE STATES 
While in general ice strength is dependent on many factors, for example, types (age 
and deformation) of ice, thickness, temperature, porosity, salinity, density. The ice 
thickness and types account for ice strengthening in the sea and hence considered as 
the most common factors of accidents. For instance, Kubat and Timco (2003) show 
in their study by analyzing 125 events of vessel damage in Canadian Arctic that most 
of the vessels were damaged due to the presence of multiyear ice.  Similarly, Canadian 
Coast Guard (2012) and ABS advisory (2014) are also stated that presence of Thick 
First Year Ice, Old Ice (Second Year and Multiyear), Ice floes, Level Ice, Deforming 
Sea Ice, i.e., Rafted ice, Ridges, Rubbles and Hummocks are significantly hazardous 
for navigation. The conditional probability tables in current OOBN model are 
constructed as follows:  
(1) The model in Figure 2.5 defines the inputs by Ice Thickness and Ice Types 
which derive the node Ice Strength.  
(2) Ice Strength is an internal node that also derives the output node Ice States. 
(3) Since pieces of floating ice/icebergs or other drifting ice features are also the 
major threats to vessel operations in the Arctic, therefore, the model also 
shows the dependency of the output node on another set of input nodes: Pieces 
of Floating Ice/ Icebergs and Drifting Ice.  
The output node, Ice States, takes values from the set {low, medium, high}. 
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2.3.2.5 HUMAN ERROR 
Rothblum (2000) argues that most marine accidents are caused by human mistakes: 
Fatigue, Inadequate Communication, Inadequate Technical Knowledge, Inadequate 
Knowledge of Own Ship System, and Decisions based on Inadequate Information are 
the main human-related issues in the marine industry. Figure 2.6 proposes a model of 
Human Error. The conditional probability tables in current OOBN model are 
constructed as follows:  
(1) The internal node Decisions based on Inadequate Information is dependent on 
the inputs Inadequate Technical Knowledge and Inadequate Knowledge of 
Own Ship Systems.  
(2) Later, the node Human Error is dependent on the said internal node. Research 
and surveys have identified that fatigue is the main problem in maritime 
industry (Margetts, 1976; National Research Council, 1990; NTSB, 1981; 
United States Coast Guard, 1995).  
(3) However, National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) (1981) also suggests 
improving the communication between shipmates and crew members, ship to 
ship, masters to pilots, and ship to VTS on board. Therefore, Human Error is 
also dependent on another set of inputs in the model i.e. the Inadequate 
Communication and the Fatigue.  
Human Error is a Boolean node that takes values of the form yes/no. 
2.3.2.6 SHIP-ICE COLLISION 
The Ship Navigational System States and the Operational Systems States are the main 
factors that define the ship’s technical strength during navigation (Canadian Coast 
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Guard, 2012a; Valdez Banda et al., 2015).  Therefore, minor negligence can cause a 
major fault in ships in the course of safe operations in ice. However, the combined 
effect of high Ice States and rough Weather States is responsible for the various 
anomalies in the environmental conditions in Arctic (Canadian Coast Guard, 2012a).  
The model in Figure 2.7 explicitly combines all the preceding OOBNs to form a larger 
model for Ship-Ice Collision. The outputs of preceding OOBNs, i.e., Ship 
Navigational System States, Operational System States, Ice States, Weather States, 
and Human Error are taken to be inputs in the proposed model (see Figure 2.7). The 
first internal node, Technical Faults, is dependent on Ship Navigational System States 
and Operational System States. The second internal node is Environmental 
Conditions, which is derived from the input nodes Ice States, and Weather States. The 
output node, Ship-Ice Collision is dependent on Technical Faults, Environmental 
Conditions, and Human Error because of obvious relationship of technical aspects, 
human fallibility, and environmental states with ship-ice collisions. The output node 
takes values of the form yes or no.  
2.3.3 Model Update 
The prior probabilities in the OOBNs (Figures 2.2-2.7) are updated continuously as 
new information becomes available. Figure 2.8 shows that all the individual OOBNs 
in the study are linked and embedded in the higher-level model. The higher-level 
model, particularly, specifies the input/output nodes by keeping the internal nodes 
encapsulated. This model has the ability to update simply by adding or subtracting 
any input/output nodes. 
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2.4 Case Study  
2.4.1 Case Description 
The proposed OOBN-based methodology is applied to an accident scenario to analyze 
the risk of oil tanker-ice collision in NSR. A hypothetical oil tanker is assumed to 
navigate from Murmansk to China (see Figure 2.9). It follows a route from the Kara 
Sea to the Laptev Sea and then to the East Siberian sea, defined by the administration 
of NSR (Arctic-Portal-Library, 2011). The major portion of the route is constrained 
by ice for much of the year. It becomes an ice-free zone only in summer. Severe 
weather conditions are other obstacles for marine transportation in NSR. 
 
 




The model examines the day-to-day risk of tanker-ice collision. The total duration of 
the journey is around thirty days. Figures 2.10-2.15 illustrate the computational 
process. As the tanker proceeds in its journey through the NSR, the probabilities are 
updated given various evidence accumulated each day. The tool AgenaRisk (2016) is 
used in this study to develop all OOBNs and perform the computation. 
Figures 2.10-2.15 demonstrate the OOBN process for day 1. Similar arguments hold 
for the other days (see Table 2.2). 
 
 




Figure 2.10.  The probability of inadequate Ship Navigational System States in NSR for 
day 1. 




Figure 2.12. The probability of rough Weather States in NSR for day 1. 
 




Figure 2.14: The probability of possible Human Error during the journey in NSR for day 1. 
 























1 0.01732 0.03093 0.03348 0.01066 0.00532 0.01065 
2 0.02194 0.03377 0.03813 0.01131 0.00610 0.01227 
3 0.02194 0.03377 0.04252 0.01134 0.00610 0.01261 
4 0.02345 0.03377 0.04252 0.01134 0.00610 0.01279 
5 0.02345 0.03377 0.02534 0.01134 0.00610 0.01148 
6 0.02345 0.03581 0.02534 0.01134 0.00610 0.01171 
7 0.02496 0.03581 0.02994 0.01323 0.00822 0.01299 
8 0.02496 0.03581 0.03456 0.01323 0.00822 0.01334 
9 0.02496 0.03581 0.03456 0.01373 0.00822 0.01337 
10 0.02496 0.03581 0.03456 0.01377 0.00822 0.01338 
11 0.02496 0.03581 0.04032 0.01413 0.00822 0.01385 
12 0.02496 0.03581 0.05905 0.01413 0.00822 0.01537 
13 0.02496 0.03581 0.05905 0.04819 0.00822 0.01736 
14 0.02496 0.03863 0.05905 0.04819 0.00822 0.01769 
15 0.02619 0.03863 0.05905 0.04819 0.00822 0.01784 
16 0.02619 0.03863 0.05905 0.05103 0.00822 0.01811 
17 0.02619 0.03863 0.05905 0.05538 0.00822 0.01839 
18 0.02619 0.03863 0.05905 0.05538 0.01033 0.01902 
19 0.02619* 0.03863 0.08247 0.05538 0.01033 0.02084* 
20 0.02619 0.03863 0.08247* 0.05538* 0.01091 0.02102* 
21 0.02619 0.03863* 0.08247 0.05117 0.01091 0.02077* 
22 0.02619 0.03863 0.08247 0.04991 0.01091* 0.02068* 
23 0.02619 0.03863 0.03564 0.04991 0.01091 0.01711 
24 0.02619 0.03863 0.03348 0.04991 0.01091 0.01692 
25 0.02375 0.03863 0.03348 0.04991 0.01091 0.01674 
26 0.01494 0.03863 0.03348 0.04991 0.01091 0.01569 
27 0.01494 0.03863 0.03348 0.02498 0.01091 0.01403 
28 0.01494 0.03300 0.03348 0.02498 0.01091 0.01338 
29 0.01494 0.02454 0.03348 0.02498 0.00663 0.01109 
30 0.01494 0.02454 0.03348 0.02000 0.00663 0.01073 





2.4.2 Results and discussions 
The analysis indicates that the voyage during the 19th, 20th, 21st and 22nd days of the 
journey are riskier than the rest of the days. The respective probabilities of collision 
are beyond the assumed acceptable risk level of 2 percent. To reduce the expected 
risk, the route of the tanker for these four days is adjusted and consequently, the 
selected values of some risk factors in the model are also changed. The solid line in 
Figure 2.16 shows the risk profile of the adjusted route of the journey. Table 2.2 and 
Figure 2.16 demonstrates that the initial days of the tanker course are less hazardous 
than the mid-voyage, while the last ten days turn out to be again less risky. 
Arbitrary data is used in this study for illustrative purposes only. A different set of 
values would give different results. The main advantage of using OOBN methodology 
is that it decomposes a complex system into small and reasonably concise 
components. Each component is reusable and can be modified separately without 
affecting the other components. For instance, the values referenced in the footnote of 
Table 2.2 are adjusted without altering any other component in the model. These 
important characteristics of OOBNs make it more advantageous than standard BNs 
(see Figure 2.17). In standard BNs, a large portion of the network may need to be 
modified for a minor modification, such as adding or deleting a node.   Since the node 
“Radar Effectiveness” is removed from one of the components of Oil Tanker -Ice 
Collision Model (see Figure 2.18), the removal did not require any changes in the rest 
of the model (see Figure 2.19). However, if the same node is deleted from the regular 
BN model of Oil Tanker-Ice Collision, its linked nodes i.e. Safe Maneuverability in 
Ice Covered Waters”, “Effective Radio Communication” and “High Winds” should 
also be deleted from the model (see Figure 2.20). While, this deletion involves 
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significant modifications in the remaining model, which is a lengthy and error-prone 
procedure. 
2.4.2.1 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
The proposed methodology also makes it simple to perform root cause and sensitivity 
analyses for each main risk factor separately (see Tables 2.3-2.8). AgenaRisk is used 
to develop all the OOBNs in this study. It is also used to analyze the sensitivity of the 
risk factors included in the developed OOBNs. 
Table 2.3 shows that the failures of the “Safe Maneuverability in Ice Covered 
Waters”, “Use Navigational Lights and Search Lights”, and “Ice Charts” impact 
significantly on “Ship Navigational System States” during the journey in NSR. Table 
2.4 shows that the failure in maintaining the “Safe Operations in Ice”, “Speed”, and 
“Effective Safety Measures” are responsible for poor “Ship Operational System 
States” in NSR. Table 2.5 shows that the “High Winds”, “Visibility”, and “Fog” are  
 
Figure 2.16. Day wise probabilistic (Risk) analysis of tanker collision in NSR. P1 is the 
position of the ship at the port of Murmansk, P2 refers to the port of Dikson (Kara Sea), P3 

















































Total number of days of tanker course in NSR
original tanker course adjusted tanker course
P1 P2 P3 P4
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 responsible for the rough “Weather System States” in NSR. Table 2.6 shows that the 
“Ice Strength”, and “Ice Thickness” equivalently account for the high “Ice States” 
in NSR. Table 2.7 shows that the “Decision based on Inadequate Information”, 
“Inadequate Communication”, and “Fatigue” contribute equally to the “Human 
Error” being affirmative in NSR. Table 2.8 shows that the “Human Error” has the 
greatest impact on “Oil Tanker-Ice Collision” in NSR. This result matches the 
conclusions of (S. Li et al., 2012) and (Rothblum, 2000). They claim that Human 
Error is the most important factor contributing to marine accidents. Table 2.8 further 
shows that “Technical Faults” are the next to Human Error in Oil Tanker-Ice 
 
 




Table 2.3. Sensitivity analysis for the risk factors in OOBN of Figure 2.10 when Ship 
Navigational System States in NSR are inadequate 
Ranking Risk Factors Sensitive value 
 
1 Safe Maneuverability in Ice Covered Waters 0.318 
2 Use of navigational lights and Search lights 0.317 
3 Ice Charts 0.256 
4 Effective Radio Communication 0.105 
5 Radar Effectiveness 0.105 
 
Table 2.4. Sensitivity analysis for the risk factors in OOBN of Figure 2.11 when Ship 
Operational System States in NSR is poor 
Ranking Risk Factors Sensitive value 
 
1 Safe Operations in Ice 0.310 
2 Speed 0.301 
3 Effective Safety Measures 0.121 
4 Effective Route Planning 0.068 
5 Ship Class 0.036 
6 Seasons 0.031 
 
Table 2.5. Sensitivity analysis for the risk factors in OOBN of Figure 2.12 when Weather 
System States in NSR are rough 
Ranking Risk Factors Sensitive value 
1 High Winds 0.476 
2 Visibility 0.130 
3 Fog 0.060 
4 Blowing Snow 0.053 
5 Season 0.050 
6 Long Polar Nights 0.049 
 
Table 2.6. Sensitivity analysis for the risk factors in OOBN of Figure 2.13 when Ice States 
in NSR is high 
Ranking Risk Factors Sensitive value 
1 Ice Strength 0.204 
2 Ice Thickness 0.204 
3 Pieces of Floating Ice/Icebergs 0.072 
4 Drifting Ice 0.051 
5 Ice Types 0.011 
 
Collision in NSR, while Technical Faults result from the inadequacy of Ship 
Navigational System States and the poor Ship Operational System States, respectively. 
Table 2.8 shows that the severe “Environmental Conditions” is further responsible for 
the Collision, whereas, the high Ice States and the rough Weather States in NSR 














Table 2.7. Sensitivity analysis for the risk factors in OOBN of Figure 2.14 when the possible 
Human Error during the journey in NSR is affirmative.  
Ranking Risk Factors Sensitive value 
1 Decision based on Inadequate Information 0.118 
2 Inadequate Communication 0.110 
3 Fatigue 0.110 
4 Inadequate Knowledge of own Ship System 0.029 











Table 2.8. Sensitivity analysis for the risk factors involved in the Oil Tanker-Ice Collision in 
NSR. 
Ranking Risk Factors Sensitive value 
1 Human Error 0.311 
2 Technical Faults 0.304 
3 Environmental Conditions 0.205 
4 Ship Navigational System States 0.128 
5 Ship Operational System States 0.127 
6 Weather States 0.087 
7 Ice States 0.074 
 
Table 2.9. Classification of uncertainty and sensitivity (adapted from (Flage & Aven, 2009)). 








One or more of the 
following conditions met: 
(a) The involved 
phenomenon is not 
well understood 
(b) The model 
assumptions (e.g. 
risk factors for 
proposed OOBN) 
made in the study 
requires strong 
simplifications 
(c) Data is not 
available or 
unreliable 
(d) There is a lack of 
agreement among 
experts 
All of the following 
conditions are met: 
(a) The involved 
phenomenon is 
well understood 
(b) The model 
assumptions (e.g. 
risk factors for 
proposed OOBN) 
made in the study 
are very 
reasonable. 
(c) Much reliable 
data is available. 




significant and minor 
uncertainties: 




but the model 
used in the 
study is not 
well defined 




Degree of  
Sensitivity 
Relatively very small 
changes are required in the 
model to alter the conclusion 
Relatively very large 
changes are required in the 
model to alter the 
conclusion 
Relatively large 
changes are required in 
the model to alter the 
conclusion.  
The above analysis reveals that the OOBN methodology allows us to investigate the 
root cause of Oil Tanker-Ice Collision individually without affecting the other factors 
that are not directly related to the collision accident.  
2.4.2.2. UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS   
Proper treatment of uncertainty is an essential part of QRA. In order to describe the 
complete picture of risk, it is required to consider both the possible consequences 
related to the activity or a system and their associated uncertainties (Flage & Aven, 
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2009). Uncertainties are defined in terms of (1) Aleatory uncertainty, and (2) 
Epistemic uncertainty.  Uncertainty about the occurrence of events is referred to as 
aleatory uncertainty, while the uncertainty that is associated with the lack of 
background knowledge about the events is termed as the epistemic uncertainty. The 
epistemic uncertainties can be reduced, but aleatory cannot and is sometimes called 
the irreducible uncertainty (Helton & Burmaster, 1996). The present study analyzes 
the epistemic uncertainty of the risk factors involved in the proposed OOBN 
methodology to see how uncertainty affects the risk of collision. For this purpose, the 
semi-quantitative method presented by (Aven, 2008) and (Flage & Aven, 2009) is 
used here, which assesses the effect of uncertainty inherent with the risk factors used 
in the OOBN model on the risk of collision. Flage and Aven (2009) further say that 
the effects on risk depends on the degree of uncertainty and sensitivity of the relevant 
risk to changes in uncertain quantities. A combination of high degree of uncertainty 
with high sensitivity could have a significant effect on model output. Nonetheless, for 
the case when the degree of uncertainty is high, and the model is insensitive to 
changes it is reasonable to consider a moderate or minor effect on risk. The 
classifications of uncertainty and sensitivity are shown in Table 2.9. 
According to the above classification, if the model assumptions are highly uncertain, 
but are reasonable, and the model itself is insensitive to changes and well defined, 
then the effect on risk is minor or moderate. In the present study, some important 
model assumptions, “Ice Strength”, and “Decision based on Inadequate 
Information”, are relatively highly uncertain because of the arbitrary data is given to 
their priors – the parent nodes (see Figures 2.10 to 2.14). These assumptions have 
been collected from various sources (see Section 2.3 for the detailed explanation). 
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The model (OOBN) is well defined as it is used to reduce the complexities occurred 
in standard BN and it is moderately insensitive to changes. For instance, the effect of 
altered values of the risk factors such as “Safe Maneuverability in Ice Covered 
Waters”, “Safe Operations in Ice”, “Visibility”, “Ice Strength”, and “Decision based 
on Inadequate Information”, on model outputs is clearly seen from Figures 2.21-2.25. 
However, due to the unavailability of data, we assume that the effect of uncertainties 
on modeled risk should be moderate (see Figure 2.26; compare the values of outputs 
in Figures 2.10-2.15 with 2.21-2.26). Table 2.10 summarizes the effects of the 
uncertain risk factors on the model output. The remaining risk factors considered in 
the model can be assessed by using the same analysis. 
 
 
Figure 2.21. Effect of the altered value of “Safe Maneuverability in Ice Covered Waters” on 





Figure 2.22. Effect of the altered value of “Safe Operations in Ice” on the output “Poor Ship 
Operational System States”. 
 
 






Figure 2.24. Effect of the altered value of “Ice Strength” on the output “High Ice States”. 
 
 
Figure 2.25. Effect of the altered value of “Decision based on Inadequate Information” on 










Table 2.10. Effect of uncertainties of risk factors/model assumptions on the risk of collision.   
Risk factors Minor Moderate Significant 
Safe Maneuverability in 
Ice Covered waters 
 x  
Safe Operations in Ice  x  
Visibility   x  
Ice strength  x  
Decision based on 
Inadequate Information 











2.5 Conclusions and Future Directions  
A model based on OOBN methodology is proposed and implemented to analyze the 
risk of maritime transportation in Arctic waters. The applicability of the proposed 
model has been demonstrated through a case study of risk analysis of Oil-Tanker-ice 
collision in ice-infested waters. The analysis reveals that,  
• Human error has the greatest impact on oil-tanker ice collision in NSR. 
• Technical faults results from the inadequacy of ship navigational system state 
and the poor ship operational system states are next to human error that 
contribute in collision, and  
• Severe environmental conditions further responsible for the collision in NSR. 
In the present study, on the basis of identified risk factors, the OOBN model is 
proposed to develop the risk based scenario of ship-ice collision in the Arctic waters 
to assess the risk of collision in the region. The proposed model simplifies the 
complicated marine accident modelling through hierarchical and component-by-
component analysis, it identifies the root causes of an accident and analyze them 
individually, it can also expand without affecting its existing components to realize 
new functions in future. The uncertainty analysis in the study also reveals that the 
proposed OOBN framework is insensitive to changes but due to the unavailability of 
the data, we assume that the effect of uncertainties on modeled collision risk is 
moderate. In the present study, the validity of the proposed OOBN model has checked 
on the route from Murmansk to China that includes the Kara Sea, the Laptive Sea, 
and the East Siberian Sea. However, with the little modification in the changing sea-
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ice and weather related conditions, the model can be applied to the other routes of the 
Arctic waters, for instance, the routes of Barents Sea, the Vilkitskii strait, and the 
routes of ice-infested waters of Atlantic Ocean, for instance, the St. Lawrence Seaway.  
The probability obtained through the proposed method can be used to support vessel 
operations decisions, such as navigational route selection and adjustment. Future 
research work is needed to expand this model and integrate it with decision-theoretic 
troubleshooting for vessel operation control to minimize navigational and operational 
risk in Arctic waters. For instance, a decision support system on corrective action 
selection and optimization for vessel operation can be investigated. 
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Chapter 3  
A Dynamic Bayesian Network model  for  
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Abstract. Extreme weather conditions of the Arctic and its icy waters pose high-
risk potential for a range of marine accidents in the region. Ship-ice collision is the 
focus of this paper. A large number of vessels operating in the Arctic waters are at 
risk of ice damage due to ship-ice collisions. The damage may vary from a minor 
hull deformation to ruptures that could put the lives, assets, and environment at risk. 
To minimize the risk of ship-ice collision in Arctic waters,  a simple yet robust 
model to make routine safety-driven operational decisions could help. The present 
study proposes a Dynamic Bayesian Network (DBN) model to fill this gap. The 
model assesses the operational risk of ship-ice collision in an ice prone region using 
the hypothetical form of observations.  Low temperatures, Weather, Ice, Fog, 
Darkness, Blowing snow, Poor visibility, Ice strength, Ice drift, Types of ice, Ice 
concentration and Speed of the vessel are considered as the primary risk factors in 
the region. The estimated collision risk would provide an easy to use indicator for 
decisions concerning safe operations in ice such as maneuvering, route selection, 
and safe speed. A case study of an oil tanker navigating across the Barents Sea is 
presented to explain the proposed model.  
 
† Khan, B., Khan, F., & Veitch, B. (2020). A Dynamic Bayesian Network model for ship-ice-
collision risk in the Arctic waters. Accepted to publish in Safety Science. 
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3.1 Introduction  
Though maritime transportation entails risks to lives, environment, and assets, it is a 
significant enabler of the development of natural resources and international trade. 
The safety of ships at sea is one of the main concerns of ship designers, shipbuilders, 
and ship owners (Soares & Teixeira, 2001). For ensuring safety at sea, that is, 
preventing human injury or loss of life and avoiding damage to the environment and 
loss of assets, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) has introduced the 
International Safety Management Code (ISM Code) (IMO, 1993). The ISM Code 
recognizes the need to ensure shipping companies take responsibility for managing 
the safety of their ships. While the International Convention for the Safety of Life at 
Sea (SOLAS) is an additional important regulation to make the shipping safer and 
reliable.  
The Arctic has attracted attention due to its short shipping routes and large oil 
resources. Compared to the Suez and Panama canals, the Arctic Ocean is the shortest 
transit route between the northern ports of the Pacific and the Atlantic (Østreng et al., 
2013). Arctic waters are known for their harsh weather and icy waters. Over the last 
few decades, a strong warming trend in the region has caused a significant reduction 
in sea ice cover (Østreng et al., 2013). This reduction benefits some of the marine 
activities in the region, but the challenging weather of the region could render the 
activity dangerous. To reduce such risk, the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) has implemented the International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters 
(Polar Code), which came into force in 2017. It deals with the risks associated with 
design, construction and equipment, operational and training issues, search and 
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rescue, and the environmental protection of Polar waters and their related ecosystems 
(IMO, 2017).  
In recent years, various studies have also been proposed to reduce the risks in the 
region, for example, Kum and Sahin (2015) investigated some causes of ship 
accidents in the region from 1993 to 2011 through root cause analysis. The authors 
proposed recommendations to reduce the occurrence probabilities of accidents, such 
as collisions and groundings in the Arctic by applying the Fuzzy Fault Tree (FFT) 
analysis. They concluded that safety is a real problem in the Arctic region and 
suggested that more Arctic navigation training centers are needed. Smith et al. (2015) 
observed in their study that the sinking and grounding of fishing vessels from 1995 
to 2004 were the most common accidents in the Arctic. The authors presented a 
comprehensive accident model that describes Arctic shipping accidents and their 
causation factors. The model identifies four factors that can influence Arctic shipping 
accidents: external, organizational, direct, and operational. They also identified three 
types of consequences: near misses, incidents, and accidents. The model also 
identifies that the ability to intervene is an important element to reduce the occurrence 
of an accident and its severity. They used case studies of the Kolskaya and Kulluk 
accidents to explain their model.  
Fu et al. (2016) considered hydro-meteorological parameters, such as wind speed, air 
temperature, visibility, sea temperature, ice concentration, ice thickness,  wave height, 
and ship performance parameters, such as ship speed, and engine power as risk 
influencing factors for Arctic navigation. By taking aforesaid influencing parameters 
as an input, the authors applied a Bayesian Belief Network to predict the probability 
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of ship besetting in ice along the analyzed route. The results of the study strongly 
suggested that prior judgments of safety and sailing conditions are necessary for ice-
going ships before sailing in Arctic waters. Baksh et al. (2018) used BN to investigate 
the possibility of marine accidents, such as collision, foundering, and grounding along 
the Northern Sea Route (NSR). In the proposed risk model, the different operational 
and environmental factors are considered as the factors that affect shipping operations 
in the Northern Sea Route (NSR). The authors demonstrated the application of the 
model by taking a case study of an oil-tanker navigating the NSR. The case study 
indicated that collision, grounding, and foundering probabilities are high in the East 
Siberian Sea. The model suggested that ice conditions are a dominant factor in 
accident causation in the NSR.  Aristova and Gudmestad (2014) reviewed the loss of 
the Kolskaya jack-up platform in the Sea of Okhotsk in 2011. The authors also 
reviewed the near-disaster of the Kulluk rig, when the rig was being towed from 
Alaska to the US in January 2013. Both incidents occurred during towing in harsh 
weather, thus the authors suggested thorough risk analysis prior to critical tow 
operations. They also highlighted the responsibility of the marine staff who are 
involved in such types of operations and emphasized the need to strengthen their role 
during towing operations in harsh weather.  
F. Khan et al. (2014) proposed a cause-consequence based model using BN to assess 
the transportation risk in Arctic waters. They estimated the probability of maritime 
accidents in the Arctic and their related consequences. Kum and Sahin (2015) 
discussed various risk factors for Arctic navigation, calculating the risk with 
probabilistic numerical levels by using the Fuzzy-AHP approach. Goerlandt et al. 
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(2017) present an analysis of navigational shipping accidents in the Northern Baltic 
Sea area that are occurred during the period of 2007-2013. The analysis is based on 
the integration of various data sources that aims to reconstruct the accident conditions 
on the best available data sources. Valdez et al. (2015) used accident data and expert 
judgments to assess the risk of winter navigation in Finnish sea areas.  Marchenko et 
al. (2015) assessed the frequencies and consequences of collision (with sea ice/others 
objects), grounding, fire, violence, or terror for several cruise ships, cargo, tankers, 
petroleum installations, and fishing boats in the Norwegian and west Russian Arctic 
regions by using risk matrices. Afenyo, Khan, Veitch, and Yang (2017) analyzed 
Arctic shipping accident scenarios by using BNs. B. Khan, Khan, Veitch, and Yang 
(2018) considered several factors that influence the risk of Arctic navigation: ship 
navigational system states, ship operational system states, weather states, ice states, 
and human error. Based on those states, the authors proposed an OOBN model that 
predicts ship-ice collision probability in the Arctic. The authors explained the 
application of the model by presenting a case study of an oil-tanker navigating the 
NSR. The case study concluded that human error followed by the technical faults and 
severe environmental conditions have the greatest impact on oil-tanker collision in 
the region. 
According to the statistics,  collision, contact, and grounding are the most prominent 
shipping accidents (Kujala et al., 2009). Such accidents are mostly of a low 
probability-high consequence in nature (Elliott et al., 2008). In recent years, various 
studies have observed that BNs have potential to reduce the risks of marine accidents 
and the risks of their related consequences (Baksh et al., 2018; Fu et al., 2016; 
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Hänninen et al., 2014; Hänninen & Kujala, 2009; Khakzad et al., 2013; B. Khan et 
al., 2018; F. Khan et al., 2014; Montewka et al., 2014; G. Zhang & Thai, 2016). 
G. Zhang and Thai (2016) discussed some of the basic reasons to choose BNs for 
modeling maritime accidents: a clear presentation of causal relationships, making 
both forward and backward inferences, combination of both experts’ judgments and 
experimental data, its power to deal with uncertainty, and making updates with new 
information and observations. However, the difficulty in collecting experts’ opinion 
is a common challenge that researchers have faced while using BNs for modeling 
maritime accidents.  
BNs are especially preferred for their ability to model human and organizational 
factors, their ability to model common causes of accidents (Khakzad et al., 2013), and 
their ability to evaluate the risk control options (Mazaheri et al., 2014) and the 
mitigants to reduce the consequences. The application of BNs has also been proposed 
to the IMO for the third step of Formal Safety Assessment (FSA), which is the risk 
control options (Hänninen & Kujala, 2009). Valdez et al.  (2016)  also proposed a BN 
model to assess and manage the risk of winter navigation operations. The authors 
analyzed the risk of oil spills in winter navigation in the Gulf of Finland through the 
proposed model. Montewka et al. (2015) used Bayesian learning techniques to 
propose two probabilistic models evaluating ship performance in ice. 
3.1.1 Limitations to BN 
Even though BN is recognized as a vigorous approach to model marine accidents and 
useful to model expert opinions, it still has some limitations that need to be handled 
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carefully, for instance;  (1) Sometimes it is asked to the experts to provide both the 
model structure and probability distributions and sometimes only probability 
distributions are required. But if the phenomenon/process is complex or not well 
understood then the obtained model structure may be far away from a clear 
visualization i.e. inability to distinguish between causes and consequences in the 
model. While experts cannot be expected to produce appropriate probability 
distribution either. (2) In BNs it is also difficult to combine conflicting expert 
opinions. (3) Moreover, converting expert knowledge into the probability 
distributions is also a challenging task while using BNs  (Uusitalo, 2007). (4) In BNs, 
reliable prior beliefs are also necessary to get reliable results. A minor mistake about 
the prior knowledge can distort the entire network and invalidate the results. (5) Since 
BNs are acyclic graphs, and thus do not support feedback loops (Jensen, 2001). 
3.1.2 Quantitative Risk Assessment: A brief overview 
Quantitative risk assessment (QRA) is also referred to as a probabilistic risk 
assessment (PRA). It systematizes the present state of knowledge including 
uncertainties about the process, activities, phenomena, and systems. It subsequently 
identifies possible hazards and threats in it along with their causes and consequences 
and describes the risk (Bai & Bai, 2014). Paltrinieri, Massaiu, & Matteini (2016) also 
define QRA as a combined approach to evaluate the risk level of an industrial system, 
which is typically based on the main technical failures that lead towards the potential 
accident scenarios.  Montewka et al. (2014) stated a well-defined definition of risk in 
their study is “ risk is a condition under which it is possible to define both a 
comprehensive set of all possible outcomes and to resolve a discrete set of 
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probabilities across this array of outcomes”  In QRA, risk is described in terms of 
probabilities and expected values.  Flage & Aven (2009) explain in their study that 
QRA is an effective tool to capture a broad picture of risks of accidents as follows;  
(a) In QRAs risk is usually described in terms of probabilities and expected values 
of hazards, and 
(b) It has the ability to treat uncertainties related to the risk obtained for the 
desired event. 
Aven  (2012) and Goerlandt & Montewka (2015) also explain that in QRAs, the risk 
has been defined as expected value, probability of an undesired event, uncertainty, 
potential losses, probability and severity of consequences, event or consequences, 
consequences + uncertainties, and effect on uncertainty on objectives.   
Most of the models in QRA utilize the concept of fault trees (FT) and event trees (ET) 
in the field of the maritime transportation system (MTS), which in certain cases may 
not completely show reality as they only allow one-way inference. This one-way 
inference may limit the applicability of FTs and ETs in the field of systematic risk 
mitigation and management (Montewka et al., 2014). This limitation has been 
recognized in QRA and various researchers use BN in order to develop a proactive 
and systematic framework to assess the risk for MTS (Afenyo et al., 2017; Baksh, Al-
Amin, Abbassi Rouzbeh, Garaniya Vikram, 2018; B. Khan et al., 2018; Khakzad et 
al., 2013; F. Khan et al., 2014). The present study also proposes a BN methodology 
as a probabilistic tool to explain the risk of ship-ice collision and applies uncertainty 
analysis to explain the uncertainties in the proposed model and also determines its 
effect on the obtained risk. 
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3.1.3 Structure of the paper 
Though BN is identified as a reliable and robust tool to model marine accidents, it 
does not account for the time dependence or the interdependency of variables. In the 
present study, we have developed a risk based scenario of ship-ice collision on the 
basis of identified risk factors. Whereas, the risk factors are based on rapidly changing 
ice and weather conditions in the Arctic. In order  to overcome the time independence 
limitation of the BN, we have used a DBN framework to model the scenerio of ship-
ice collision risk for the Arctice waters.  This work proposes a simple yet robust model 
for safety-focused operational decision making. The proposed model relies on the 
hypothetical form of data to assess the risk of collision in given operational 
conditions. The effectiveness of the proposed model is demonstrated using a case 
study for the winter navigation of oil-tanker on the Barents Sea. Before presenting 
details of the model, a brief description of DBN is given below (section 3.2). Section 
3.3 presents the proposed BN model of the ship-ice collision, section 3.4 presents the 
associated DBN model of the BN model, proposed in section 3.3 through a case study 
that uses a hypothetical accident scenario related to oil-tanker collision along the 
Barents Sea. Section 3.5 presents results and discussions. Section 3.6 discusses the 




3.2 Dynamic Bayesian Network  
DBN is a particular form of BN. DBN models the dynamics of the system by 
considering time dependence (Sarshar et al., 2013). The process is recursive and each 
time slice/timestep of the process acquires the same structural form as the previous or 
next slice (Fenton & Neil, 2013). Time slices reflect the change in the 
state/probabilities of the parameters in the model, this is the reason, the model is 
called dynamic. The state of a system at time 𝑡 in a DBN is represented as follows, 
where, X1, X2, …, Xn are the set of random variables. The general structure of DBN is 
shown in Figure 3.1. The previous, current, and future time slices are represented as 
t−1, t, and t+1 respectively. The relationship between the variables within a time slice 
is called intra slice arcs, and the relationship between the variables in different time  
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Figure 3.1. General structure of DBN.  
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slices is called inter time slices (Cai et al., 2013).  𝑋𝑡−1, 𝑌𝑡−1 , 𝑍𝑡−1,  𝑋𝑡, 𝑌𝑡 , 𝑍𝑡,  
𝑋𝑡+1 , 𝑌𝑡+1,  and 𝑍𝑡+1are the sets of random variables in previous, current, and future 
time slices respectively. The Hidden Markov model is considered as the simplest DBN  
(Onisko, 2010). DBN supports multivariate time series i.e. not limited to a single time 
series. It supports both temporal and non-temporal nodes in the same model. Whereas, 
temporal nodes are the initial conditions observed at time t = 0.   DBNs are the 
probabilistic graphical models that are used to describe the uncertainties of diverse 
situations. They can reduce the computational complexities, predict complex 
phenomena, and provide support to decision making in the scenarios where data is 
not clear and variables are highly interlinked (Sarshar et al., 2013). Cai et al. (2013) 
used DBNs to assess the risk of human factors on offshore blowout and Sarshar et al. 




































Figure 3.2. Ship-ice collision model for the winter navigation in Arctic waters 
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3.3 The Proposed Methodology  
Figure 3.2 shows the proposed methodology of the ship-ice collision (C) model for 
the winter navigation of a vessel in the Arctic region. The model is simple and static 
in nature that aims to explain the primary risk factors of the ship- ice collision in the 
region and their dependencies without the influence of time. 
3.3.1 Defining the risk factors used in the ship-ice collision model 
The proposed BN model in Figure 3.2 is based on Low temperatures (L), Weather 
(W), Ice (I), Fog (F), Darkness (D), Blowing snow (B), Poor visibility (P), Ice strength 
(IS), Ice drift (ID), Types of ice (T), Ice concentration (IC) and  Speed of the vessel 
(S).  L, weather parameters W  such as,  F and D  potentially increase the navigational 
risk at different locations of higher latitudes due to P. B in the region can also create 
unsafe working conditions for the personnel due to P. Such severe conditions may 
affect the performance of the equipment, material characteristics, and the 
functionality of the vessels, which, if not operated correctly, reduce the functionality 
and availability of the safety barriers (Galić et al., 2013). Such reductions in the safety 
barriers can cause the ship to collide with ice or another object. The presence of sea 
ice I in terms of high IS and IC along with the presence of ID at different locations 
are considered as the major threats to vessel operations in the region.  Kubat and 
Timco (2003) found that most ships in the Canadian Arctic were damaged due to the 
presence of multiyear ice. Canadian Coast Guard (2012) and ABS advisory (2014) 
also recognized that the presence of various types of ice T such as thick first-year ice, 
old ice, ice floes, and deformed ice are significant risks for the Arctic navigation. 
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Marchenko (2012) reveals in his study that most of the casualties in the  Russian 
Arctic occurred due to sea ice.  
To reduce the navigational risks in the ice-covered waters, S is an important factor to 
be controlled. For such purpose, B. Khan, Khan, & Veitch (2019); B. Khan et al. 
(2018) and F. Khan et al. (2014) proposed models in their studies that can be able to 
manage the safe speed of ships in ice. Authors of the abovesaid studies consider (S) 
as an operational risk factor, however, in the present study, we associate the speed of 
a vessel with the environmental conditions of the Arctic.  
3.3.2 Defining the structure of the ship-ice collision model  
During the period in which the Arctic routes are accessible, vessels can expect to 
encounter low temperatures, causing ice formation and foggy weathers along with the 
darkness due to the long polar nights.  We, therefore, take the L node as the parent 
node of W and I nodes and take W node as the parent node of F and D nodes in Figure 
3.2. Since fog, darkness, and blowing snow are the main factors causing reduced or 
poor visibility, therefore,  F, D, and  B are taken as the parent nodes of P node in 
Figure 3.2. Likewise, I node in Figure 3.2 is taken as the parent node of T and IC. 
Since, types of ice (including shape and size), ice concentration, and drift ice account 
for ice strength; therefore, T, IC and ID nodes are taken as the parents of IS node. 
Since both poor visibility and ice strength can cause ship-ice collision C in the Arctic, 
therefore, we take (P) and (IS) as the parent nodes of C. High speed in ice is also an 
important factor that can cause ship-ice collision therefore, (S) is also included in the 
set of parents of C node. To understand the structure of the proposed ship-ice collision 
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model for this study, interested readers should consult (ABS advisory, 2014; Canadian 
Coast Guard, 2012; B. Khan et al., 2018; F. Khan et al., 2014; B. Khan et al., 2019; 
Sahin & Kum, 2015; Kubat & Timco, 2003; Baksh et al., 2018). 
3.4 Associated DBN model of ship-ice collision model 
⎯ Winter navigation of oil-tanker on the Barents Sea  
This section presents the associated DBN model of the ship-ice collision model 
proposed in Figure 3.2 of section 3. The arcs are made dynamic and nodes (risk 
factors) are made time-dependent.  The model is applied to the winter navigation of 
the oil-tanker on the Barents Sea. 
The Barents Sea, situated between northwestern Europe, Svalbard, Franz Josef Land, 
and Novaya Zemlya. Freezing in the region usually starts from late September and 
reaching up to its greatest extent during March or April. In winters, the prevailing ice 
type in the Barents Sea is the first year FY ice. Northern parts of the Barents Sea 
influence the ice drifts ID, which is used to exchange a large amount of sea ice 
between the Arctic Ocean and the Kara Sea (Alexandrov et al., 2004). Also, the 
northern part of the Barents Sea hosts some of the other characteristics of Arctic 
waters during winters such as cold temperatures, darkness, and polar lows  (i.e. low 
temperatures throughout the winters). Currently, a large percentage of Arctic shipping 
activity involves transportation through the Barents Sea. In 2009, the volume of oil 
exported to the western market through the region was estimated to be around 15 
million tons (Østreng et al., 2013). 
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The proposed model is used to calculate the risk of oil-tanker-ice collision, the time 
dependency of nodes and arcs in the model has to be altered according to the 
prevailing ice and weather conditions of the region.  The model is intended to support 
operational decisions in connection with time, such as the selection of navigational 
routes, and safe speed to reduce the risks of C in the ice-covered waters. For instance, 
in the present study, it is assumed that oil-tanker is navigating on the Barents Sea, the  
hour-to-hour changings in sea-ice and weather related conditions in the region are 
continously observed during navigation. The changes are used to make updates in 
evidences, and based on the evidences, the hour-to-hour risks in the region are 
estimated. Tables 3.2, 3.3, and, 3.4  explain the process of updating evidences and 
calculating risks on hour-to-hour bases respectively. These hour-to-hour updates help  
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the oil-tanker to divert its path from  challenging areas and reduce the risks of collision 
during navigation. 
3.4.1 Temporal dependencies of the nodes in DBN: Working mechanism 
of the proposed DBN model  
The present section discusses the temporal dependencies of the nodes in the proposed 
DBN model. The model in Figure 3.3 shows that the Init Conditions (initial condition) 
and Term Conditions are the parts of the network that consist of those nodes that have 
the children and parent nodes present inside the Temporal Plate. For instance, W and 
I are the initial conditions and the parent nodes in the model. Nodes existing outside 
the Temporal Plate are static. For instance, Low temperatures (L), in the model is 
taken as the static node because temperatures in winters are constantly low throughout 
the Barents Sea. Temporal nodes are based on temporal beliefs and evidence. 
Temporal nodes in the model are shown in the Temporal Plate; it is the area in DBN 
that shows the number of timesteps for which the Bayesian  inference will be carried 
out, for instance, F, D, B, P, IS, ID, T, IC, S, and C are temporal nodes in the model 
(see Figure 3.3). 
The dynamic arcs, that join the temporal nodes in the Temporal Plate represent 
changes over time among the variables (Figure 3.3). The single digits numbers on the 
arcs imply the temporal delay of influence (Onisko, 2010). For instance, an arc labeled 
as 1 between the variables B and P implies the influence that takes one timestep. An 
arc labeled as 2 between the variables F and P implies an influence that takes two 
timesteps. The model encodes the following conditional distribution over C: 
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 𝑃(𝐶𝑡|𝐼𝑆𝑡, 𝑃𝑡, 𝑆𝑡−2, 𝑆𝑡−1) (3.2) 
Eq. 3.2 shows that conditional probability distribution for C at time = t depends on 
the current status of IS and P at time = t, also it depends on S recorded in one and two 
timesteps before at time = t−1 and t−2 respectively. In the proposed DBN model, we 
have arbitrarily selected 8 timesteps to perform the analysis, however, it can be 
extended for more timesteps. In order to record evidence, timesteps for the proposed 
DBN model can be chosen in terms of days, hours, or minutes. While, in the present 
study, timesteps have been selected in terms of hours and evidence has been recorded 
on an hour-to-hour basis, respectively. These timesteps are required to calculate the 
risk of collision for the entire journey.  
3.4.1.1 CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY TABLES 
There are three types of arcs coming into the node of oil-tanker-ice collision: (1) 
regular arc representing static relation between the nodes at timestep t = 0, (2) 
temporal arc with label 1at timestep t = 1, and (3) temporal arc with label 2 at timestep 
t = 2. This shows that there are three different conditional probability tables quantify 
oil-tanker-ice collision C.  Eqs. 3.3-3.5 agree with the three conditional probability 
tables in the model as follows: 
 𝑃(𝐶𝑡=0|𝑆𝑡=0) (3.3) 
 𝑃(𝐶𝑡=1| 𝑆𝑡=1, 𝑆𝑡=0) (3.4) 




Table 3.1. Input values of  I, W, L for the oil-tanker-ice collision model (for the  winter 







0.60 0.60 0.75 
Eq. 3.3 shows that initially at timestep t = 0, C depends on the speed S of the oil tanker 
only. Eq. 3.4 shows that at timestep t = 1, C depends on the  S which is recorded in 
previous timesteps i.e. at t = 0 and 1, respectively. Eq. 3.5 shows that at timestep t = 
2, C depends on IS, P, and S, whereas, IS and P are recorded in current timestep i.e. 
at t =2, and S is recorded in previous steps i.e. at timestep t = 0 and 1, respectively. 
Similarly, the model (Figure 3.3) encodes the following distributions over IS and P: 
 𝑃(𝐼𝑆𝑡| 𝑇𝑡, 𝐼𝐶𝑡, 𝐼𝐷𝑡, 𝐼𝐷𝑡−1) (3.6) 
 𝑃(𝑃𝑡|𝐷𝑡 , 𝐹𝑡, 𝐵𝑡−1, 𝐵𝑡−2) (3.7) 
Eq. 3.6  shows the conditional probability distributions over IS at time = t depends on 
the current status of T, IC, and ID  at time = t, also it depends on ID recorded in one 
timestep before at time = t−1. Likewise, the conditional probability distribution over 
P at time = t in Eq. 3.7, depends on the current status of D and F  at time = t, it also 
depends on B recorded in one and two timesteps before at time = t−1 and t−2 
respectively. There are two types of arcs coming into the node IS: (1) temporal arc 
with label 1 at timestep t = 1, and (2)  temporal arc with label 2 at timestep t = 2 and 
three types of arcs coming into the node P: (1) regular arc at timestep t = 0,  (2) 
temporal arc with label 1 at timestep t = 1, and (3) temporal arc with label 2 at timestep 
t = 2. There are three types of conditional probability tables quantifying IS and P at 
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timesteps t = 0, 1, 2 in the model. Eqs. 3.8-3.13  match the six conditional probability 
tables related to IS and P as follows: 
 𝑃(𝐼𝑆𝑡=0) (3.8) 
 𝑃(𝐼𝑆𝑡=1| 𝐼𝐷𝑡=1) (3.9) 
 𝑃(𝐼𝑆𝑡=2| 𝑇𝑡=2, 𝐼𝐶𝑡=2, 𝐼𝐷𝑡=2, 𝐼𝐷𝑡=1) (3.10) 
 𝑃(𝑃𝑡=0|𝐵𝑡=0) (3.11) 
 𝑃(𝑃𝑡=1|𝐵𝑡=0, 𝐵𝑡=1) (3.12) 
 𝑃(𝑃𝑡=2|𝐷𝑡=2, 𝐹𝑡=2, 𝐵𝑡=1, 𝐵𝑡=0) (3.13) 
All nodes in the proposed model are Boolean except IS that takes values from the set 
{High, Moderate, Low}, and T that takes values from the set {MFI, TFI, OI, IF} 
respectively. Nodes L, P, and C take values from the set {Yes, No}, Nodes ID, F, D, 
B take values from the set {Present, Absent}. Nodes IC  and S take values from the 
set {High, Low}, the node W takes values from the set {Harsh, Moderate}, and the 
node I takes values from the set {High, Moderate}. Input values (prior probabilities) 
of I (presence), W  (harsh), and L are shown in Table 3.1. 
The software  GiNIie 2.2 (BayesFusion, 2018) is used to develop the proposed DBN 
model and perform computations for this study. Most of the data used in the model 
are for the illustrative purpose only.  
3.4.1.2. INPUT DATA OF I, W, AND L 
While, the input values (prior probabilities) (see Table 3.1) for the present study have 
been selected from the previous literature (Alexandrov et al., 2004; Østreng et al., 
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2013).  Unlike the Kara and Laptev seas, sailing conditions in the Barents sea with 
respect to the ice and weather conditions are much favorable. In the winters, the ice 
area in the Barents sea usually comprises 55-60 percent of the total sea area. 
Furthermore, freezing temperatures in the region reaching up to its greatest extent 
from March to April, covering 75 percent of the sea area with low temperatures 
(Østreng et al., 2013); Alexandrov et al., 2004). Thus, the input values of  I  (presence) 
and W (Harsh), and L (Temperature) nodes in Table 3.1 are considered into this 
prospect. 
3.5 Results and Discussions  
The DBN model presented in Figure 3.3 depends on the observations that are made 
at time = t, t−1, and t−2 respectively. The present section discusses the cases I, II, and 
III, that have been arisen from the proposed DBN model. Each case describes the risk-
based scenarios for  C, IS, and P separately. Equations that have been encoded through 
the proposed DBN model in Section 3.4 are used to calculate the risks of C, IS, and P 
individually. The present section also discusses the results that have been obtained 
through the said cases.  
3.5.1 Case-I: Risk of Oil-tanker-ice collision (C) 
In this case, the proposed DBN model will calculate the risk, (R) of oil-tanker- ice 
collision C  (Eq. 3.14) with respect to the given dynamic evidence IS, P, and S at time 




Table 3.2. Risk of collision C in the Barents Sea with respect to IS, P, and S  at t, t−1, and 
t−2 respectively. 
t in hours Risk of Collision C Dynamic evidence (input) for calculating C over time 
0 0.10 Presence of low IS, high P, high S observed when the voyage 
is in its initial hour of the journey  at t = 0. 
1 0.25 Presence of moderate IS and high P, observed in current 
timestep t = 1; high S observed in timesteps  t-1. 
2 0.10 Moderate IS and high P, observed in current timestep t = 2 
but low S is observed at t-1 i.e. at t=1 and high S is observed 
in t-2, i.e. at t=0 respectively. 
3 0.10 Low IS and low P, are observed in current timestep t = 3, and 
high S is observed in t-1, i.e. at t = 2 and low S is observed in 
t-2 i.e. at t = 1 respectively. 
4 0.25 Presence of high P and high IS are observed in current 
timestep t=4, and the constant high speed of a vessel is 
observed in t -1 and t -2 i.e. at t = 3 and t =2 respectively. 
5 0.10 High IS, high P observed at current timestep t = 5; low S 
observed at t-1, and high S observed at t-2, i.e. at t = 3.  
6 0.15 Low IS, no P are observed in current timestep t = 6, and 
constant low S is observed in t-1 and t-2 i.e. at t = 5 and t = 4 
respectively. 
7 0.15 Low IS, high P are observed in current timestep t = 7, and 



























 Risk of C = Prob(C(yes)|E), (3.14) 
whereas,  
 𝐸 = 𝐼𝑆𝑡(𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ), 𝑃𝑡  (𝑁𝑜), 𝑆𝑡−2 (𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ), 𝑆𝑡−1(𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ) (3.15) 
whereas, Eq. 3.15. calculates evidence for C at time = t, t−1, and t–2 respectively, 
when the presence of high IS and absence of P are observed in current timestep t, and 
constant high S is observed in previous timesteps t = t−1 and t−2 respectively. Eq. 
3.15 is continuously used to update evidence for C at time = t, t−1, and t−2 
respectively. 
3.5.2 Case-II: Risk of high Ice Strength (IS) 
In this case, the proposed DBN model will calculate the Risk (R) of high IS with 
respect to the given sets of dynamic evidence such as T, IC, ID at time = t, t−1, and 
t−2 respectively, as follows: 
 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 (𝑅) 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑆 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐼𝑆(High)|𝐸), (3.16) 
where,  
 𝐸 = 𝑇𝑡(𝑇𝐹𝐼), 𝐼𝐶𝑡(High), 𝐼𝐷𝑡(present), 𝐼𝐷𝑡−1(absent) (3.17) 
Eq. 3.16 calculates R of IS with respect to T, IC, and ID at time = t, t−1, and t−2 
respectively. Eq. 3.17 calculates evidence for high IS, at time = t, t−1, t−2  when the 
presence of Thick First Year Ice (TFI), high IC, and the presence of ID are observed 
in current timestep t, while, the absence of ID is observed at t = t−1 respectively.  
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Table 3.3. Risk of high IS  in the Barents Sea with respect to T, IC, and ID at t, t-1, and t-2     
respectively. 
t in hours R of high IS Dynamic evidence (input) for estimating the probability of high 
IS over time  
0 0.01 Presence of MFI, low IC, and absence of ID are observed in 
current timestep i.e. t =0, when the voyage is in its initial hour of 
journey. 
1 0.20 Presence of MFI and low IC are observed in current timestep i.e. 
t =1 and the presence of ID is observed in current timestep i.e. t 
=1 and the absence of ID is observed in previous timestep t -1 i.e. 
t = 0. 
2 0.50 Presence of high IC and OI are observed in current timestep i.e. t 
=2 and the presence of ID is observed in current timestep i.e. t =2 
and in previous timestep t-1 i.e. t = 1 respectively. 
3 0.15 Presence of MFI and low IC are observed in current timestep i.e. 
t = 3 and presence of ID is observed in current timestep t as well 
as in previous timestep t -1 i.e. t =3 and t = 2 respectively. 
4 0.80 Presence of MFI and high IC are observed in current timestep i.e. 
t =4 and the presence of ID  is observed in current timestep i.e.  t 
=4 and in previous timestep t-1 i.e. t = 3 respectively. 
5 0.50 Presence of high IC and OI are observed in current timestep i.e. t 
=5 and the presence of ID  is observed in current timestep i.e. t =5 
and  in previous timestep t-1 i.e. t = 4 respectively 
6 0.01 Presence of low IC and TFI are observed in current timestep i.e. t 
=6 and the absence of ID is observed in current timestep i.e. t = 6 
and the presence of ID is observed in previous timestep t – 1i.e. t 
= 5 respectively.  
7 0.15 Presence of low IC and IF are observed in current timestep i.e. t 
=7 and the absence of ID is observed in current timestep i.e. t = 7 
as well as in previous timestep t – 1i.e. t = 6 respectively. 
 
Eq. 3.17 is continuously updating evidence for  Eq. 3.16  at time = t, t−1, and t−2, 
respectively. 
3.5.3 Case III: Risk of Poor visibility (P) 
In this case, the proposed DBN model will calculate the Risk (R) of P with respect to 
the given sets of dynamic evidence such as D, F, B at time = t, t−1, and t−2 




Table 3.4. Risk of P in the Barents Sea with respect to D, F, and B at t, t-1, and t-2 respectively. 
t in hours Probability of P Dynamic evidence (input) for estimating the probability of P 
over time 
0 0.99 Presence of F and absence of D, are observed in the current 
timestep i.e. t =0 when the voyage is in its initial hour of 
journey. 
1 0.70 Presence of F and absence of D,  are observed in current 
timestep i.e. t =1 and the presence of B is observed in previous 
timesteps t -1 i.e. at t =0. 
2 0.70 Presence of F and absence of D, are observed in current 
timestep i.e. t =2 and the absence of B is observed in previous 
timestep t -1 i.e. at t =1 and presence of B is observed in 
previous step t – 2 i.e.  t = 0. 
3 0.30 Absence of F and D, are observed in current timestep i.e. t =3, 
and the continued absence of B is observed in both of previous 
timesteps t -1 and t -2 i.e. t =2 and t =1 respectively. 
4 0.90 Presence of F and D, are observed in current timestep i.e. t =4 
and the continuous absence of B is observed in both of 
previous timesteps t -1 and t -2 i.e. t =3 and t =2 respectively. 
5 0.70 Presence of F and absence of D, are observed in current 
timestep i.e. t =5 and the presence of B is observed in previous 
timestep t -1 i.e. at t = 4 and the absence of B is observed in 
previous step t – 2 i.e. 
 t = 3. 
6 0.01 Absence of F and D, are observed in current timestep i.e. t =6, 
and the continued absence of B is observed in both of previous 
timesteps t -1 and t -2 i.e. t = 5 and t = 4 respectively. 
7 0.70 Presence of F and D, are observed in current timestep i.e. t =7 
and the continuous absence of B is observed in both of 
previous timesteps t -1 and t -2 i.e. t = 6 and t = 5 respectively 
 
 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 (𝑅) 𝑜𝑓 𝑃 =  𝑃(𝑃(𝑌𝑒𝑠)|𝐸) (3.18) 
where,  
 𝐸 = 𝐷𝑡(present), 𝐹𝑡(present), 𝐵𝑡−1(absent), 𝐵𝑡−2(present) (3.19) 
Eq. 3.18 calculates the R of P with respect to D, F, and B at time = t, t−1, and t−2 
respectively.  Eq. 3.19 calculates evidence for  P, at time = t, t−1, t−2  when the  
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presence of both  D and  F is observed in current timestep t, and the presence and 
absence of B are observed at t = t−1 and t−2 respectively. Eq. 3.19 is continuously 
updating evidence for Eq. 3.18  at time = t, t−1, and t−2, respectively. 
3.5.4 Analyses of the results obtained through the risk-based scenarios 
presented in Cases I, II, and III 
The analysis presented in Table 3.2 and Figure 3.4 indicates that the R of C at timestep 
t =1 is 0.25, which is beyond the assumed acceptable level of collision risk for winter 
navigation i.e. 0.15. However, this is due to the presence of moderate IS and P both 
are observed in current timestep t = 1 and high S of an oil-tanker is observed in 
previous timestep t = 0 ⎯ when the journey was in its initial hour, where the risk was 
observed to be 0.1.  Similarly, the R of C in the region is also observed 0.25 at t = 4, 
due to the presence of high IS and P are observed in current timestep t = 4, and the 
constant high S of a vessel is observed in the previous two timestep at t = 3 and t =2 
respectively. Similarly, the analysis in Table 3.3 and Figure 3.5 shows that the risk of 
high ice strength, i.e.  R of IS = 0.8 at t = 4  in the Barents Sea is due to the presence 
of MFI, high IC, and ID is observed in current timestep t along with the presence of 
ID is observed in the previous timestep t−1 too. Furthermore, R of IS = 0.5  at t = 2 
and t = 5  in the region is due to the presence of high IC, OI, and ID are observed in 
current timesteps t, also the presence of ID is observed in the previous timesteps t−1 
too. Moreover, R of the presence of P (Table 3.4 and Figure 3.6) in the region is due 
to the presence of F is observed in current timestep t and the presence of B is observed 




Figure 3.5. Risk of high IS in the Barents Sea (hour-to-hour variation). 
 
 






























































Table 3.5. Effect of uncertainties of risk factors on the obtained risk.   
Risk Factors Minor Moderate Significant 
F  x  
D  x  
B  x  
P  x  
IS  x  
ID  x  
IC  x  
complete picture of the risk of C, IS, and P and their dynamic evidence in the Barents 
Sea. Nevertheless, on the comparison of results in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 with the results 
of Table 3.2, it is revealed that such an increase in the R of high IS and the presence 
of P is hazardous for the vessels in the region and intensifies the risk of C in the 
region. 
3.5.5 Uncertainty Analysis 
Uncertainties are defined in terms of  (1) Aleatory uncertainty, (2) Epistemic 
uncertainty. Aleatory uncertainty is associated with the occurrence of events, while 
epistemic uncertainty is associated with the lack of background knowledge about the 
events. The epistemic uncertainties can be reduced, but aleatory cannot and is 
sometimes called the irreducible uncertainty (Helton & Burmaster, 1996).  The 
present study analyzes the epistemic uncertainty of the risk factors involved in the 
proposed methodology to see how the uncertainty affects the risk. Therefore, in the 
present study, we have used the semi-quantitative method presented by (Flage, R and 
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Aven, 2009). The authors provide the guideline for significant, moderate, and minor 
uncertainties as follows. 
(1) Significant uncertainty: The involved phenomena are not well understood, risk 
factors that are used in the proposed methodology require strong 
simplification, data is not available or unreliable, and there is a lack of 
agreement among experts. 
(2) Minor uncertainty: The involved phenomena are well understood, risk factors 
that are used in the proposed methodology are very reasonable, much reliable 
data is available, and there is a broad agreement among experts. 
(3)  Moderate uncertainty: The involved phenomena are well understood, but the 
model used in the study is not well understood, and some reliable data is 
available. 
Nevertheless, the proposed model in the present study and its involved phenomena is 
well understood as it is explicitly explained in sections 3.3 and 3.4, however, due to 
the unavailability of the data, it is assumed that the effect of uncertainties on the 
obtained risk should be moderate (see Table 3.5). Besides, in many situations, there 
is some uncertainty, that may arise from the way, we observe the risk factors or collect 
the evidences, this additional uncertainty also affects the obtained risk in the region.  
3.6 Conclusion  
The present study proposes the risk-based model of the ship-ice collision scenario that 
is based on BN methodology. The model is later followed by an associated DBN 
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model of the oil-tanker-ice collision scenario. The associated DBN model is applied 
to the winter navigation of the oil-tanker on the Barents Sea. The purpose of 
generating the associated DBN model of the main ship-ice collision model is to 
support the operational and navigational decisions while navigating on the Arctic 
waters in connection with time.  Such time-oriented decisions are more vigorous in 
reducing ship-ice collision risks in the region.  
The analysis reveals that the presence of moderate or high ice strength in the current 
timestep is significant to increase the risk of oil-tanker-ice collision in the Barents 
Sea. However, the presence of poor visibility in the current timestep and the high 
speed of the oil-tanker in the previous two timesteps are the other major factors that 
can increase the risk of collision in the region. The analysis also shows that the 
presence of different types of ice and high ice concentration in the current timestep 
and the presence of ice drift in either current or previous timestep can cause high/ 
moderate risk of ice strength in the region.  The continuous presence of ice drift in the 
current, as well as the previous timesteps, also causes the risk of ice strength to 
increase. Such an increase in the risk of ice strength increases the risk of collision in 
the region. Also, the presence of fog or darkness in the current timestep can cause the 
risk of the presence of poor visibility. The presence of blowing snow in the previous 
two timesteps causes the visibility in the region, even more, worse and can produce 
extremely hazardous conditions for the vessels in the region.   
In the present study, we have considered the environmental risk factors such as 
weather and ice in generating the ship-ice collision model because various risk factors 
that are operational or organizational do not change with respect to time, sometimes 
98 
 
they exist within the system for years and cannot be identified as a safety issue unless 
they are explicitly examined. However, frequent hour-to-hour observations of weather 
and ice conditions in the Arctic can reduce the collision risk up to a reasonable extent. 
DBN methodology in maritime risk analysis studies is advantageous in such a way 
that it reduces the computational complexities by making the risk factors time-
dependent, the methodology also provides support to decision making where data is 
not clear.  
The DBN model proposed in this study can be extended to more than 8 timesteps. The 
proposed DBN model can be useful in route selection, it could be used to develop an 
early warning system that could help avoid the ship-ice collision. The collision 
probabilities and the hourly probabilities of ice strength and poor visibility that are 
obtained through the model could be helpful in decision making concerning safe 
operations in ice.  
In the present study, the validity of the proposed DBN model has checked on the 
Barents Sea. However, with the little modification in the changing sea-ice and weather 
related conditions, the model can be applied to the other routes of the Arctic waters, 
for instance, the route from Murmansk to China that covers the important part of NSR, 
the Vilkitskii strait, and the routes of ice-infested waters of Atlantic Ocean, for 
instance, the St. Lawrence Seaway.  
In order to get reliable results, it is necessary to have reliable prior beliefs. BNs and 
DBNs are only useful if the prior knowledge given to them is reliable; minor mistakes 
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Chapter 4  
A cel lu lar  automat ion model for  convoy 
traff ic in  Arct ic  wate rs
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supervised the study. They have made technical contributions by providing the 
conceptual understanding of the model and subsequently provided technical 
feedback, reviewed the model and results. All authors read and approved the final 
draft. 
Abstract. Marine transportation in arctic waters involves risk due to the presence 
of ice, rapid weather changes, reduced visibility, and remoteness. Icebreaker 
assistance and ice-convoys are used to facilitate the safe navigation of commercial 
vessels transiting Arctic waters. The collision between individual ships, or a ship 
and an icebreaker, during a convoy is a potential danger. To study such risk, this 
paper presents an updated Nagel-Schrekenberg (NaSch) model of the marine 
convoy traffic integrated with a BN based probabilistic approach. This approach has 
been used to predict the maximum waterway density for the safe flow of traffic, and 
the collision probability during a convoy. The approach is tested here on a convoy 
in the Vilkitskii strait. The BN model proposed here could assist in assessing the 
failure probabilities of the causal factors and their contribution to collision 
likelihood. It may also be useful in developing a collision monitoring system that 
provides a real-time estimate of collision probability. The estimated probability 
could be used as an early warning for potential collisions, thus enhancing safe 
navigation and safety at sea. 
 
‡ Khan, B., Khan, F., & Veitch, B. (2019). A cellular automation model for convoy traffic in Arctic 




4.1 Introduction  
Arctic waters are known for their challenges to marine transport. The presence of sea 
ice, long cold winters, short cool summers, strong winds, heavy blowing snow, waves, 
reduced visibility due to fog, long polar nights, and inadequacy of ship navigational  
systems due to remoteness contribute to the risk of Arctic marine transportation. To 
reduce such risks, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) has implemented 
the International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code), which came 
into force in 2017. The prime purpose of the Code is to deal with risks associated with 
design, construction,  equipment, operational and training issues, search and rescue, 
and the environmental protection of the polar ecosystem (IMO, 2017).  
Due to the growing interest in marine resources in the Arctic, such as fisheries, 
hydrocarbons, minerals, and tourism, and the potential for new shipping routes 
through the Arctic from Asia to Europe and North America, the opportunities for 
maritime activities in the Arctic are increasing (Eguíluz et al., 2016). Eguíluz et al. 
(2016) examined the maritime activities in the Arctic between 2010 and 2014 and 
reported that during 2014, a total of 11,066 ships were detected in the Arctic region, 
in which the majority of ships were supply, research, and survey vessels. The 
remaining were fishing, cargo, tanker, and passenger's vessels. (F. Khan et al., 2014) 
dynamically assessed transportation risk related to safe navigation in the Arctic by 
proposing a cause-consequence based model using BN: they estimated the probability 
of maritime accidents in the Arctic and their related consequences.  Sahin and Kum 
(2015) described various risk factors in the Arctic and obtained numerical weights for 
each risk factor by using the fuzzy-AHP approach. They calculated the risk with 
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probabilistic numerical levels. Marchenko, Borch, Markov, and Andreassen (2015) 
used risk matrices to assess frequencies and consequences of collision (with sea ice 
and other objects), grounding, fire, violence or terror for cruise ships, cargo ship, 
tankers, petroleum installations, and fishing boats in the Norwegian and the west 
Russian Arctic regions. Montewka et al. (2014) developed a framework for estimating 
the risk of maritime transportation in the Gulf of Finland. Their study focused on ship-
ship collision in the open sea involving a RoPax vessel (Montewka et al., 2014). Kum 
and Sahin (2015) used a fuzzy fault tree analysis to investigate the root causes of 
Arctic marine accidents from 1993 to 2011. Smith, Veitch, Khan, and Taylor (2017) 
discussed ways to measure system performance of Arctic shipping operations in terms 
of their resilience. The authors proposed the functional resonance analysis method 
(FRAM) to identify sources of resilience and system vulnerabilities.  B. Khan, Khan, 
Veitch, and Yang (2018) developed a quantitative risk assessment tool for ship-ice 
collisions using the OOBN method. Goerlandt, Montewka, Zhang, and Kujala (2017) 
investigated escort and convoy operations in ice conditions in Finnish waters using 
AIS and sea ice data. Their study focused on the relationship between the domain size 
of the ship and the existing ice conditions in the Gulf of Finland. They also 
investigated the escort and convoy speeds in Finnish waters with respect to the 
prevailing ice conditions.  
The Arctic waters are only navigable for about three to three and a half months of the 
year, and most shipping activities are possible only with icebreaker escort. Icebreaker 
escort is sometimes organized to lead a convoy of ships. The possible collisions 
between the individual ships and between an icebreaker with the leading ship during 
a convoy put the crew and the ship at potential risk. The current study adopts the 
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Cellular Automata (CA) technique to study the marine convoy transportation risk. CA 
models are useful for simulating large systems (Q.-L. Li et al., 2016). Wolfram (1986) 
described CA as a regular uniform lattice (or array), usually infinite in extent (size), 
with a discrete variable at each site (cell). It evolves in discrete time steps, i.e., the 
value of the variable at one site is affected by the values of variables at sites in its 
neighborhood at the previous time step. The neighborhood is usually defined as the 
site itself and all the immediate adjacent sites.  Based on the values of the variables 
in the neighborhood at the previous time step, and according to the definite sets of 
local rules, the variables at each site are updated simultaneously. According to 
(Straatman et al., 2001), CA models are very simple but have enough capacity to 
generate complex behaviors. According to (Fishwick, 1995), CA-based models are 
more generic than Partial Differential Equations (PDEs). CA has many applications 
in coastal zone management, ecology, computer science, and physical sciences. It is 
extensively used in the study of vehicle traffic flow (Qi et al., 2017b). For example, 
single-lane traffic has been modelled using the Nagel-Schreckenberg (NaSch) CA 
model in which the velocity of the vehicle is gradually increased by only one unit per 
timestep (Nagel & Schreckenberg, 1992).  It is also used to model freeway road traffic 
flow.  It provides a basic understanding of traffic flow regarding global density, and 
global flows of the vehicle that help in avoiding congestion and collisions in the lanes.  











𝐽(𝜌) =  
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑣𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡





It is capable of incorporating human behavior, which is a crucial factor when 
modeling traffic networks.  It is a simple probabilistic CA model based on rule 184 
(Wolfram, 1986; Wright, 2013). Rule 184 is a one-dimensional binary cellular 
automation rule; it forms the basis of many cellular automation models of traffic flow 
(Wolfram, 1986). In this model, particles that represent vehicles move in a single 
direction.  Their starting and stopping depend on the vehicles in front of them 
(Wolfram, 1986).  The number of particles remains unchanged during the simulation.  
The NaSch model is for single-lane traffic where vehicles cannot pass each other; 
there is no overtaking. With a little updating of the rules, the NaSch model can also 
be used in maritime traffic flow (Blokus-Roszkowska & Smolarek, 2015; Feng, 2013; 
Liu et al., 2010; Qi et al., 2017a). 
To study the dynamics of the flow in the navigable channels of the Arctic, the present 
study uses the updated NaSch model of the marine convoy traffic.  The updated model 
can be useful to predict the maximum density for the waterway; it can be helpful in 
avoiding the ship-ship and ship-icebreaker collision during a convoy. The updated 
NaSch model integrated with a BN  model is further helpful in relating the 
macroscopic properties of the system- such as Maximum velocity, 𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥, Deceleration 
probability, 𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, and Critical density, 𝜌𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 of the traffic flow- with 
the main factors for convoy safety-such as Maintaining a safe distance between 2 
ships, Safe operations in ice, Maintaining a safe speed in ice, and   Maintaining a 
safe distance between an icebreaker and a leading ship during a convoy. The outcome 
of the integrated model is the estimation of critical density for the flow of convoy 
traffic, and collision probability (ship-ship and ship-icebreaker) during a convoy.  The 
remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 4.2 presents the methodology, 
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section 4.3 presents the simulations and results, and section 4.4 discusses the 
conclusion of the study and future work. 
4.2 Collision accident modeling methodology  
Figure 4.1 shows the generic framework proposed for the study.  
4.2.1 NaSch model  
The classical NaSch model consists of a one-dimensional grid of L sites. The sites can 
be empty or occupied by a single vehicle of velocity zero to 𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥, when the velocity 
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model and see the effect of Pdeceleration , 
Vmax and ρcritical, On the main factors for 
convoy safety.















tions have been adopted for this model. No vehicle can overtake. Periodic boundary 
conditions are the set of boundary conditions that are used to approximate a large or 
infinite system into unit cells. The NaSch model consists of a set of four rules. The 
rules must be applied for each iteration Te (timestep) in the direction of travel (Wright 
2013). The rules of the NaSch model for single-lane traffic (Nagel & Schreckenberg, 
1992; Wright, 2013) are stated as follow 
• Acceleration: If a vehicle 𝑛 has a velocity 𝑣𝑛, and 𝑣𝑛 is less than the maximum 
velocity 𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥, the vehicle will increase its velocity by one unit   
 𝑣𝑛 < 𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥; 𝑣𝑛 =  𝑣𝑛 + 1 (4.3) 
• Deceleration to avoid accidents: If a vehicle n is at site 𝑖, and the next vehicle 
is at site 𝑖 + 𝑑, and after step 1, the velocity of nth vehicle i.e. 𝑣𝑛 is greater or 
equals to 𝑑, the velocity of the vehicle 𝑣𝑛 is reduced according to 
 𝑖𝑓 𝑣𝑛 ≥ 𝑑; 𝑣𝑛 = 𝑑 − 𝑘 (4.4) 
where, d is the space between the i th  and (i+1)th  vehicle, and k is the 
minimum safe distance between the two vehicles. In NaSch model, 𝑘 = 1 that 
is the minimum safe distance between two vehicles is 1 cell. 
• Randomization (reaction): For a given deceleration probability 𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  , 
the velocity 𝑣𝑛 of the vehicle 𝑛 is reduced as follows: 
 𝑣𝑛 =  𝑣𝑛 − 1 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (4.5) 
• Move forward: A vehicle 𝑛 at a site 𝑥𝑛 moves forward by a number of steps 
equal to its velocity 𝑣𝑛: 
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 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑣𝑛 ; 𝑥𝑛 = 𝑥𝑛  + 𝑣𝑛 (4.6) 
4.2.2 Updated NaSch model with respect to a marine convoy traffic  
In a marine convoy traffic, ships are required to maintain a safe zone between each 
other and between the icebreaker and the leading ship of the convoy, to avoid 
collisions. The required safe zone is known as the ship domain (Fujii & Tanaka, 1971; 
Liu et al., 2016; Pietrzykowski & Uriasz, 2009; Toyoda & Fujii, 1971; N. Wang, 2013; 
Y. Wang & Chin, 2016). The ship domain is used to define the safe distance between 
ships (Liu et al., 2010).  According to  recent research, the ship domain is dynamic 
(Liu et al., 2016; Pietrzykowski & Uriasz, 2009; Y. Wang & Chin, 2016), as 
environmental conditions such as harsh weather and ice, velocity, size, operational 
and navigational skills, and waterway conditions  all are factors that can affect the 
size of ship domain (Qi et al., 2017a).  
In the present study, the waterway for convoy traffic is divided into n sites. Each site 
can only contain one ship at a time with a velocity of zero to 𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥.  Ship traffic is 
heterogeneous, so most of the time, the maximum velocity 𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥 of different ships 
varies (Qi et al., 2017a), and can be influenced by factors such as harsh weather, ice, 
operational and navigational states of the ships, and human action, any of which can 
cause the ship to decelerate. The same phenomena also occur in other types of traffic 
(Nagel & Schreckenberg, 1992; Wright, 2013), but the causes are different. This 
phenomenon is called the randomization, and  𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is called the 
randomization deceleration probability (Nagel & Schreckenberg, 1992; Qi et al., 
2017b; Wright, 2013).  
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In the proposed framework, we have estimated the critical density with respect to the 
deceleration probability and maximum velocity of the system and then integrate the 
proposed framework of updated NaSch model with the BN. The integrated model is 
used to assess the risk of collision in the marine convoy traffic navigating on the 
Arctic waters.  Assumptions of the updated NaSch model are; if 𝑣𝑛 is the velocity of 
the nth ship in a convoy, 𝑑𝑛 is the space that the nth ship gives to its preceding ship 𝑝, 
𝑘𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒,𝑛 is the minimum safe distance between ship 𝑛 and the preceding ship 𝑝 during 
a convoy, 𝑣𝑝 is the velocity of the preceding ship in a convoy, and 𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥 is  the 
maximum velocity of ships in a convoy.  The updated rules of the proposed model 
with respect to the stated assumption can be defined as follows: 
• Acceleration:  
 𝐼𝑓 𝑑𝑛 > 𝑘𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒,𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛, 𝑣𝑛(𝑡) = 𝑣𝑛 (𝑡) + 1; 𝑣𝑛(𝑡) < 𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥 (4.7) 
Eq. 4.7 reflects the behavior of a ship operator in a convoy to attain the 
maximum speed. 
• Deceleration: 
 if 𝑑𝑛 < 𝑘𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒,𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛, 𝑣𝑛 (𝑡) = 𝑑𝑛 − 𝑘𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒,𝑛;  𝑘𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒,𝑛 = 1 cell  (4.8) 
• Randomization: For a given deceleration probability 𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 , the 
velocity 𝑣𝑛 of the nth ship is reduced as  
   𝑣𝑛(𝑡) =  𝑣𝑛(𝑡) − 1 for 𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (4.9) 
Ships in a convoy may decelerate due to harsh weather, ice, operational and 
navigational states of the ships, and operator’s action. 
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• Move Forward (location update): After the above steps, the location of the 𝑛th 
ship at 𝑡 is 𝑥𝑛(𝑡), the velocity of the 𝑛th ship at 𝑡 + 1 is 𝑣𝑛(𝑡 + 1), thus at 𝑡 +
1, the location of the 𝑛th ship in a convoy is defined as follows 
 𝑥𝑛(𝑡 + 1) = 𝑥𝑛(𝑡) + 𝑣𝑛(𝑡 + 1) (4.10) 
Eqs. (4.3) to (4.10) are based on the general properties of the single traffic lane. 
Wright (2013) further explains the equations as follows: Eqs. (4.3) and (4.7)  reflect 
the behavior of  the operators who want to attain the maximum possible velocity 𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥 
with acceleration equal to 1. Eqs. (4.4) and (4.8) intend that vehicles do not crash: 
according to both equations, the speed of the nth vehicle 𝑣𝑛 should be equal to or 
greater than the minimum safe distance between the two vehicles in a convoy. If the 
distance between the two vehicles in a convoy is shorter than the minimum safe 
distance, a collision is more likely to occur (Goerlandt, Montewka, et al., 2017). Eqs. 
(4.5) and (4.9) add randomness, which is essential to simulating traffic flow, enabling, 
for example, traffic jams. Eqs. (4.5) and (4.9) indicate that a vehicle could randomly 
decelerate for a given 𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛. 𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is a stochastic component introduced 
in the NaSch model by randomization, which considers the non-deterministic motion 
of vehicles due to the operators’ behavior. Eqs. (4.6) and (4.10) allow the vehicles to 
move forward along the route.  
4.2.3 Bayesian Network 
A BN is based on direct dependencies between a set of variables. These dependencies 
are shown in the form of a directed graph and the set of node probability tables (NPT). 
The directed graph consists of sets of nodes and arcs. The nodes correspond to 
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variables, while arcs are directly used to link the variables. For example, in Figure 4.5 
the arcs from the nodes Maintaining a safe speed in ice to Maintaining a safe distance 
between 2 ships and maintaining a safe distance between an icebreaker and a leading 
ship show that there is a causal dependence of Maintaining a safe speed in ice on 
Maintaining a safe distance between 2 ships and Maintaining a safe distance between 
an icebreaker and leading ship. The node Maintaining a safe speed in ice is then said 
to be a parent node of nodes Maintaining a safe distance between 2 ships and 
Maintaining a safe distance between an icebreaker and a leading ship . BN are 
directed acyclic graphs (DAG), i.e. the graphs have no cycles. For example, in a graph 
G, if there is an arc from the node A to B and an arc from B to C, then there cannot be 
an arc from C to A. In DAG, each node A has an associated probability table called 
the node probability table (NPT) of the node A. This is the probability distribution of 
A given the set of the parents of A, i.e. 
 𝑃(𝐴|𝐴1, 𝐴2, … … … … … . 𝐴𝑛),  (4.11) 
where A1, A2, …, An are the parents of A. Moreover, if node A has no parents, then it 
is called the root node, and in this case, the NPT of A is merely the probability 
distribution of A (Fenton & Neil, 2013). NPTs that are assigned to the nodes show the 
conditional dependencies between the variables. BN allows updating of prior 
probabilities based on new information. 
4.3 Testing the model at Vilkitskii Strait  
The updated NaSch model enables us to obtain the 𝜌𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 of marine convoy 
traffic in Arctic waters. In this section, the proposed model is applied to a convoy  
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Table 4.1. Estimation of critical densities 𝜌𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 of marine convoy traffic at 
Vilkitskii strait with respect to the varied maximum velocities 𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥 and deceleration 
probabilities 𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛. 
𝒗𝒎𝒂𝒙 𝒑𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝝆𝒄𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒍 𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒚 
1  0.01 0.50 
3  0.01 0.25 
3  0.10 0.22 
3  0.30 0.18 
5  0.02 0.18 
5  0.24 0.12 
5  0.01 0.18 
5  0.30 0.10 
navigating through the Vilkitskii strait. The Vilkitskii strait is along the NSR; it is the 
primary connection between the Kara and the Laptev Sea. It has a length of 60 nautical 
miles and depth of 100 to 200 meters. Ships of any size and draft can pass through it 
(Østreng et al., 2013). The Strait is typically navigable from July to October.  We 
divide the length of Vilkitskii strait into 200 equal sites/cells (i.e. n =200 cells), so 
each cell has a length of 556m. We take 200 iterations i.e. (Te = 200), where each Te 
is approximately 1 second (an approximation of the response time of a ship operator). 
Russia has opened new export opportunities for commercial shipping through NSR, 
such as for oil tankers, gas and bulk carriers, and cargo ships bringing materials for 
industrial and mining activities (ABS advisory, 2014). In the current study, we assume 
a convoy comprised of 10 vessels – assumed to be oil tankers and bulk carriers - 
transiting the NSR from Vilkitskii strait lead by an icebreaker.  
The results of the simulation  show that the  𝜌𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 of the flow is smaller for 
the larger values of 𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥 and   𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛. Increasing 𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥 and  𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛cause 
the maximum flow and mean velocity of the system to collapse at lower densities, 




Figure 4.2. Simulation results of marine convoy traffic at Vilkitskii Strait using updated 
NaSch model with 𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 0.02, 𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 5, 𝑛 = 200, and 𝑇𝑒 = 200 (a) Mean velocity, 




Figure 4.3. Simulation results of marine convoy traffic at Vilkitskii Strait using updated 
NaSch model with  𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =  0. 01, 𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1, 𝑛 = 200, and 𝑇𝑒 = 200, (a) Mean 







Figure 4.3 shows the relationship is symmetric due to the particle-hole symmetry 
(Schadschneider & Schreckenberg, 1993) that has broken at 𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥 > 1 (Wright, 2013).  
 A BN model is constructed to see the effect of  𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥,  and 
𝜌𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 on the main factors for the convoy safety at the strait, i.e.  Maintaining 
a safe distance between 2 ships, Safe operations in ice, Maintaining safe speed in ice, 
and   Maintaining a safe distance between an icebreaker and a leading ship during a 
convoy (see section 4.1). The factors are Boolean nodes in the BN that take values 
from the set {Yes, No}. The nodes Deceleration probability 𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, and 
Maximum velocity 𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥  take values from the set {High, Medium, Low}. The node 
Critical density (𝜌𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦) takes values from the set {System collapse at lower 
density, System does not collapse at lower density}. For illustration purpose, 
let  𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 5 (high), 3 (medium), and 1 (low) (see Figure 4.5). The BN is also used 
  
Figure 4.4. Simulation results of marine convoy traffic at Vilkitskii Strait using updated 
NaSch model with 𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =  0. 01, and 𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 3, 𝑛 = 200, and 𝑇𝑒 = 200, (a) Mean 




to estimate the probability of collision  (ship-ship/ ship-icebreaker) during a convoy 
(see Figure 4.5). The software AgenaRisk (2016) is used in this study to develop the 
BN model and perform related computations. The conditional probability tables in the 
proposed BN model are constructed as follows: 
(1) The node Critical density is dependent on the input nodes Deceleration 
probability and Maximum Velocity. 
(2) The node Critical density derives the nodes Maintaining a safe distance 
between two ships in a convoy and Maintaining a safe speed in ice. 
(3) The node Maintaining a safe distance between two ships in a convoy is also 
dependent on Maintaining a safe speed in ice. 
(4) The node Safe Operation in ice in the model is dependent on Maintaining a 
safe distance between two ships in a convoy and Maintaining a safe distance 
between an icebreaker and the leading ship of a convoy.  
(5) The node Maintaining a safe distance between an icebreaker and the leading 
ship of a convoy is dependent on Maintaining a safe speed in ice. 
(6) The output node Collision in the model is dependent on Maintaining a safe 
distance between two ships in a convoy and Maintaining a safe distance 
between an icebreaker and the leading ship of a convoy. 
4.3.1 Estimation of collision probability 
Operators of ships in a convoy are responsible for maintaining a safe distance and 
speed between the adjacent vessels. The commanding officer of the icebreaker will 
assign the required distance to be maintained between itself and the leading ship of 
the convoy (Canadian Coast Guard, 2012a).   In this section, we consider the effect 
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of the 𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥 , and 𝜌𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 on the main factors for convoy safety.  
At low 𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 and low 𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥, there is a 90% chance that the system will not 
collapse at the lower densities (see Figure 4.5). The result also agrees with Table 4.1. 
This will increase the chance of avoiding collisions during a convoy. 
The Estimated Collision Probability (C) in this study is 0.0128 (see Figure 4.5). The 
failure probabilities of the nodes in the BN (Figure 4.5) and their effect on the  
 
 
Figure 4.5. BN of Estimated Collision probability (C) during a convoy at Vilkitskii strait. 
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Table 4.2.  Failure probabilities of the nodes and their effect on Estimated Collision Probabilities 
Ranking Nodes in BN Failure probabilities of the nodes for Estimated 
Collision probabilities C, C1, C2, C3 
Effect of the nodes on Estimated Collision 
Probabilities C, C1, C2, C3 (% contribution) 
(sensitivity analysis) 
1 Maintaining a safe distance between 2 
ships. 
0.064 0.096 0.077 0.200 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 
2 Safe operation in ice. 0.052 0.078 0.062 0.160 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 
3 Maintaining a safe speed in ice. 0.040 0.060 0.050 0.120 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 
4 Maintaining a safe distance between 
an icebreaker and a leading ship. 
0.040 0.06 0.048 0.120 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 
5 Critical density. 0.100 0.150 0.120 0.310 12.0 12.8 12.8 12.8 
6 Deceleration probability. 0.200 0.300 0.200 0.200 6.00 6.40 7.70 9.00 
7 Maximum velocity.  0.200 0.200 0.300 0.200 2.00 3.80 2.60 6.40 
 
Table 4.3. Input data for the Estimated Collision C 
Deceleration 
probability 
Max. velocity Critical 
density 
 Maintains a 
















𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥  𝜌 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦      C 
L  M H L M H L H Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N 






Table 4.4. Estimated collision C1 due to the change in the input values of Deceleration probability. 
Deceleration 
probability 
Max. velocity Critical 
density 
Maintains a 














𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥  𝜌𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦      C1 
L  M H L M H L H Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N 
0.4 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.15 0.85 0.94 0.06 0.904 0.096 0.922 0.078 0.94 0.06 0.0192 0.9808 
 
Table 4.5. Estimated collision C2 due to the change in the input values of maximum velocity. 
Deceleration 
probability 
Max. velocity Critical 
density 
Maintains a 














𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥  𝜌𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦      C2 
L  M H L M H L H Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N 
0.5 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.12 0.88 0.95 0.05 0.92 0.077 0.94 0.062 0.95 0.048 0.0154 0.985 
 
Table 4.6. Estimated collision C3 due to the change in the input values of critical density. 
Deceleration 
probability 
Max. velocity Critical 
density 
Maintains a 














𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥  𝜌𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦      C2 
L  M H L M H L H Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N 




Estimated Collision C can be seen in Table 4.2. Table 4.3 shows the input data for C.  
Table 4.2 also shows the failure probabilities of the nodes for C1, C2, and C3. These 
failure probabilities can be obtained by taking different input values of macroscopic 
properties in the BN (see Tables 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6). Tables 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 show that 
a small change in the values of macroscopic properties can have a profound impact 
on the factors for convoy safety. It is also observed that the macroscopic properties of 
the system contain less sensitive values for all C, C1, C2, and C3, but are exclusively 
responsible for the failures of the factors for convoy safety.  The failures of all the 
factors are equally sensitive for the collisions during a convoy (see Table 4.2). For the 
present study, data values for the BN are estimated from the case study of oil tanker-
ice collision proposed by B. Khan et al. (2018) and experts’ opinion. 
4.4 Conclusions  
The study presented a NaSch model adapted to marine convoy traffic. The proposed 
model was used to estimate the critical densities for convoys transiting Arctic waters 
to avoid jams and collisions. The model further combined with a BN model to see the 
effect of certain macroscopic properties of marine convoy traffic on the main factors 
for convoy safety. The integrated model was also used to estimate the collision 
probabilities for convoys in Arctic waterways. The utility of the proposed model was 
established through the simulation of a convoy of 10 oil tankers and bulk carriers 
passing through the Vilkitskii strait. The study observed that increasing 𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
and 𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥   cause the maximum flow and mean velocity of convoy traffic to drop at 
lower densities, resulting in sudden traffic jams and possible collisions during a 
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convoy. The study observed that lower Critical densities with high Deceleration 
probabilities and Maximum velocities are wholly responsible for the failures of the 
main factors for convoy safety. A slight change in the values of macroscopic 
properties can significantly affect the main factors for safety. All these factors are 
equally sensitive to collision.  It was also observed in the study that high Densities 
along with the lower Deceleration probabilities and velocities prevent the factors for 
convoy safety from failure and avoid jams and collision during a convoy. 
The proposed model provides a new perspective of the dynamics of Arctic 
Navigation, and an opportunity to monitor collision probability in real-time. The 
estimated probability can be used as a mechanism to develop an early warning and 
collision avoidance system.  It can be useful in decision making concerning safe 
convoy operations, such as maneuvering, route selection, towing, and escorting.  The 
estimated probability can also be useful in the selection of safe speed, maintaining a 
safe speed during a convoy, and maintaining a safe distance between the icebreaker 
and the leading ship of the convoy and the ships within the convoy. 
The proposed model simplifies maritime accident modeling by developing a practical 
understanding of the role of macroscopic properties of the traffic flow in maritime 
convoys. It is also helpful in predicting the maximum density of any given waterway 
for the safe flow of traffic. The developed model can be used as a guiding tool to 
control and minimize the navigational and operational risk in Arctic waters. The 
proposed updated NaSch model study has some  limitations that need to be addressed 
i.e. it cannot be used for two-way traffic. Also, in the integrated model, the maximum 
safe distance between two ships must be calculated according to the prevailing ice 
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conditions in the waterways, harsh weather, and operational and navigational states 
of the ships in the convoys. The application of the current updated CA model of 
marine convoy traffic needs to be extended further to overcome such limitations in 
future. In the present study, the validity of the proposed model has checked on the 
Vilkitskii strait. However, the model can also be applied to the other routes of the 
Arctic waters, for instance, the route from Murmansk to China in NSR, the routes of 
Barents Sea, and the routes of ice-infested waters of Atlantic Ocean, for instance, the 
St. Lawrence Seaway.  
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Chapter 5  
Integrated accident model  for  marine 
convoy traff ic  in  ice -covered waters
§
Co-authorship statement. A version of this chapter is accepted for publication 
in the International Journal of Maritime Engineering, published by The Royal 
Institution of Naval Architects. The lead author, Bushra Khan, has developed the 
model, tested the model, analyzed its results and wrote the manuscript. Co-authors 
Dr. Faisal Khan and Dr. Brian Veitch supervised the study. They have made 
technical contributions by providing the conceptual understanding of the model and 
subsequently provided technical feedback, reviewed the model and results. All 
authors read and approved the final draft. 
Summary. Independent safe navigation in ice-covered water is difficult. 
Icebreaker assistance is required for sailing through ice-covered waters. This poses 
an additional risk of collision. The study proposes a modified Human Factor 
Analysis and Classification (HFACS) framework to identify and classify 
contributing risk factors during a convoy. HFACS integration with Nagel-
Schrekenberg (NaSch) model considers an operator’s behaviour and links it with 
the occurrence of various risk factors. The study finds significant influence in risk 
from small changes in two new factors, viz., crew reduction and crew overload. For 
example, based on the sensitivity analysis, it is determined that about a 17% 
contribution of crew reduction and about a 24% of contribution of crew overload 
increase the contribution of risk taking by an amount of approximately 93% in the 
overall risk of accidents.  The accident probabilities obtained here will be helpful in 
decision making concerning safe operations during a convoy. 
 
 
§ Khan, B., Khan, F., & Veitch, B. (2020). Integrated accident model for marine convoy traffic in ice-
covered waters. Accepted for publication in the International Journal of Maritime Engineering (RINA 






5.1 Introduction  
Icebreaker assistance is used extensively to support shipping in ice-covered waters,  
including icebreaker escort of single or several ships (M. Zhang et al., 2019). Such 
operations are useful for reducing the risk of vessel-ice damage during ice navigation.  
If the distance between the ships and the icebreaker is not maintained appropriately,  
collision accidents could occur between the icebreaker and a leading ship, and 
between the assisted ships during a convoy. Valdez Banda (2017) showed that 48% of 
accidents in the Baltic Sea and 55% of accidents in the Northern Sea Route (NSR) 
have occurred under the same icebreaker assistance conditions.  
Khan et al. (2019) studied the dynamics of the traffic flow in navigable channels.  The 
authors proposed an updated Nagel-Schrekenberg (NaSch) model to estimate the 
critical densities of the convoys to avoid  sudden traffic jams and collisions during a 
convoy in Arctic waterways. They tested the model on the Vilkitskii strait and 
combined it with a BN model to estimate the ship-ship and ship-icebreaker collision 
probability during a convoy. Goerlandt et al. (2017) investigated the escort and 
convoy operations using Automatic Identification System (AIS) and sea ice data. 
They also investigated the escort and convoy speeds with respect to the prevailing ice 
conditions in the Gulf of Finland. The authors focused on the relationship between 
the domain size of the ship and the existing ice conditions in the Gulf.  Ship domain 
is a safe distance between ships in a convoy, while ships are required to maintain a 
safe zone between each other and between the icebreaker and the leading ship of a 






Human errors are often recognized as a main cause of accidents (Chen & Chou, 2012; 
Islam et al., 2016, 2020; B. Khan et al., 2018; Rothblum, 2000). According to the 
statistics, human error contributes 84-88% in tanker accidents, 79% in towing vessel 
groundings, and 89-96% in collisions (Transportation Safety Board of Canada, 1993). 
Islam et al. (2018, 2017) applied human error assessment during maintenance 
operations of marine systems. Similar to aviation accidents (Wiegmann & Shappell, 
2003), HFACS is also used in various marine investigations, including HFACS-MA, 
HFACS-Grounding, HFACS-SIBCI (Chen & Chou, 2012; Mazaheri et al., 2015; M. 
Zhang et al., 2019, 2018) as well as railway accident investigations (Baysari et al., 
2008; Reinach & Viale, 2006). An HFACS framework is specifically developed to 
define the relevant active and latent failures in Reason’s swiss cheese model 
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). Initially, it contains four layers of risk levels: (1) 
unsafe acts, (2) precondition for unsafe acts, (3) unsafe supervision, and (4) 
organizational factors, together with 19 classifications. Reinach and Viale (2006) 
proposed a fifth layer called the external factors. The authors believed that the 
economy, law, and policy should also be considered during the identification of 
accident risk factors. Later, other authors also used the five-layer HFACS model in 
their studies to identify the risk factors, such as HFACS-Ground (Mazaheri et al., 
2015) and HFACS-SIBCI (M. Zhang et al., 2019, 2018). The layers in HFACS model 
are hierarchical: each layer is dependent on the previous one and factors are believed 
to make progress from active to latent conditions as they progress up the hierarchy 






The present study has proposed a five-layer Human Factor Analysis and Classification 
System-Marine Convoy Traffic and Accident in Ice-covered waters (HFACS-MCTAI) 
model with 21 classifications. Changes have been proposed in preconditions for 
unsafe acts, unsafe supervision, organizational factors, and external factors, on the 
basis of which accident risk factors can be identified and classified. The cause-
consequence relationship between risk factors has been developed to estimate the 
accident probabilities of unsafe acts, preconditions of unsafe acts, unsafe supervision, 
organizational factors, and external factors during a convoy navigation. The updated  
Construct HFACS-
MCTAI 
Identify contributing risk 
factors and classify them on 
the basis of HFACS-MCTAI









Estimate the Critical Density
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MCTAI with updated 
NaSch model using BN
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NaSch model (B. Khan et al., 2019) is used to estimate the critical density of the 
convoy traffic in order to avoid  traffic jams and collisions in  ice-covered waters. 
Next, the updated NaSch and HFACS-MCTAI models are integrated in a BN and form 
a model called the Integrated Accident Model (IAM) for Marine Convoy Traffic in 
Ice-covered Waters. This integrated model extends the concept of an operator’s 
behaviour during a convoy by adding the knowledge of various risk factors that are 
identified and classified through the proposed HFACS-MCTAI model. Further, the 
model is also extended to observe the effects of unsafe acts, preconditions for unsafe 
acts, unsafe supervision, organizational factors, and the external factors on critical 
density, maximum velocity, deceleration probability and a sudden traffic jam during 
a convoy in ice-covered waters. Also, the model estimates the accident probabilities 
of collision between two ships, ship-ice collision, and collision between an icebreaker 
and the leading ship in a convoy. The proposed methodology is applied to a case study 
that involves convoying through the St. Lawrence Seaway. The remainder of the paper 
is structured as follows: section 5.2 presents the methodology, section 5.3 presents the 
results and discussions, and section 5.4 discusses the conclusions of the study. 
5.2 The Framework to Develop Integrated Accident 
Model  
Figure 5.1 presents the general framework of the proposed collision risk model. In the 
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5.2.1 HFACS-Marine Convoy Traffic and Accidents in Ice-covered 
waters (HFACS-MCTAI) model 
This section presents the HFACS-MCTAI model adapted from Wiegmann and 
Shappell (2003). The proposed model has five layers of accident risk levels: (1) unsafe 
acts of the operators, (2) preconditions for unsafe acts, (3) unsafe supervision, (4) 
organizational factors, and (5) external factors. The risk levels have 21 classification 
categories (see Figure 5.2). Some changes have been made in the second, third, fourth, 
and fifth layer of the proposed HFACS-MCTAI model. The changes are briefly 
discussed as follows: 
i. The classification category, technical faults (B. Khan et al., 2018) has been 
introduced to the second layer of the proposed HFACS-MCTAI model. 
ii. Two classification categories, inadequate planning regarding operations in ice, 
and failure to recognize a hazard during a convoy have been introduced to the 
third layer of the proposed HFACS-MCTAI model, instead of planned 
inappropriate operations, and failure to correct problem of the original HFACS 
model.  
iii. We replace the classification category organizational climate with safety 
culture in the fourth layer of the proposed HFACS-MCTAI model. 
organizational climate can be viewed as the overall working environment 
within the organization, while safety culture actually refers to unspoken rules, 






Shappell, 2003). Precisely, culture is stable and permanant while, climate is 
dependent and fluctuates in response to change in local variables (Yule, 2003).  
iv. The classification category economic pressures instead of social factors has 
been introduced to the fifth layer of the proposed HFACS-MCTAI model. 
The proposed model identifies and classifies various accident risk factors that can 
affect a marine convoy in ice-covered waters. Risk factors have been used to develop 
the proposed model are obtained by studying various accident literatures (Chen & 
Chou, 2012; Danial et al., 2018; Danial, Smith, Khan, et al., 2019a, 2019b; Danial, 
Smith, Veitch, et al., 2019; B. Khan et al., 2018, 2019; Mazaheri et al., 2015; National 
Research Council, 1990; Reinach & Viale, 2006; Rothblum, 2000; Sahin & Kum, 
2015; Yule, 2003; M. Zhang et al., 2019, 2018). Sections 5.2.1.1 to 5.2.1.5 discuss the 
above-mentioned risk levels and their classification categories. 
5.2.1.1 UNSAFE ACTS OF OPERATORS 
Unsafe acts of operators can be classified into two categories: errors and violations 
(Reason, 1990). Errors are generally characterized as mental or physical activities of 
individuals/employees that fail to achieve the desired outcome. Violations , on the 
other hand, are deliberate acts that disregard the rules and regulations regarding safety 
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). Rasmussen (1982) and Reason (1990) classified 
errors into decision-based, skill based, and perceptual errors, while violations are 
classified into routine violations and exceptional violations (see Figure 5.2).  
Decision-based errors are due to the intentional behaviour or actions of an individual 






Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). Skill-based errors are technical errors that are caused 
due to improper implementation procedures, inadequate training or low job 
competency. Perceptual errors result from  misunderstandings or misjudgments (M. 
Zhang et al., 2019). Routine violations are due to frequently ignored rules and 
instructions, while, exceptional violations occur due to violations of operating 
procedures. Such violations stem from the inexperience or lack of discipline of 
operators (Mazaheri et al., 2015; M. Zhang et al., 2019). 
5.2.1.1 PRECONDITIONS FOR UNSAFE ACTS 
Wiegmann and Shappell (2003) concluded that approximately 80% of all aviation 
accidents are due to unsafe acts. The authors also found that the main cause of unsafe 
acts in aviation accidents is the preconditions for unsafe acts. These preconditions 
include the environment, condition of operators and personal factors.  The same 
factors are also analyzed as the main causes for unsafe acts in marine accidents (Chen 
& Chou, 2012; Mazaheri et al., 2015; M. Zhang et al., 2019). 
Physical environments, such as harsh weather, can cause unsafe conditions. However, 
in the proposed HFACS-MCTAI model, we have included ice in the physical 
environment. Severe states of ice (B. Khan et al., 2018) can cause a major 
precondition for unsafe acts in maritime accidents. The condition of operators,  such 
as an adverse psychological and physical state due to lack of sleep, and  fatigue, can 
cause a major precondition for unsafe acts in aviation (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003) 
as well as in  marine accidents (Chen & Chou, 2012; Mazaheri et al., 2015; M. Zhang 






planning and inadequate judgment, which are considered as factors of poor personal 
readiness, can also play an important role in the precondition for unsafe acts . 
The newly introduced classification category, i.e., technical faults, has been proposed 
as an addition to preconditions for unsafe acts.  Technical faults such as mechanical 
and navigational failures or poor maintenance can cause mental and physical fatigue 
in the crew (Rothblum, 2000) which can act as major preconditions for unsafe acts in 
marine accidents. 
5.2.1.3 UNSAFE SUPERVISION 
Unsafe supervision includes inadequate supervision, which is defined as failure to 
provide  proper guidance and training appropriate to the given situation. It also 
includes failure to identify and control risks during operations (Mazaheri et al., 2015; 
M. Zhang et al., 2019). The newly introduced classification categories: (1) inadequate 
planning regarding operations in ice, and  (2) failure to recognize a hazard during a 
convoy, involve inappropriate planning and disregard for the possible risks associated 
with ice. The fourth classification category of unsafe supervision, i.e., supervisory 
violations, occurs when the supervisor intentionally disregards instructions, guidance, 
rules, or operating instructions by breaking speed and distance rules (Mazaheri et al., 
2015; M. Zhang et al., 2019) that are established according to the given ice conditions. 
5.2.1.4 ORAGANIZATIONAL FACTORS 
Wiegmann and Shappell (2003)  highlighted the fact that most of the time 






latent failures most often revolve around issues related to resource management, 
organizational climate, and operational processes.   
Zhang et al. (2019) in their study also introduced an emergency process to the 
organizational factors.  The proposed HFACS-MCTAI model introduced the class 
safety culture in place of organizational climate to organizational factors. Resource 
management and organizational processes remained the same, while emergency 
preparedness is adopted from  Zhang et al. (2019). 
Resource management involves the allocation and maintenance of organizational 
assets, such as human resources, monetary assets, equipment and facilities 
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). Wrongly distributed resources often lead to a safety 
hazard (M. Zhang et al., 2019). The newly introduced classification category safety 
culture introduces the broad concept of organizational environments related to 
appropriate training of crew, using vessels of appropriate ice strength in a convoy, 
appropriate decisions, proper maintenance, appropriate scheduling, management 
practices and policies that fecilitate proper risk control options. Any of the these 
factors which fall outside the acceptable range of values can result in a severe safety 
breach. Organizational processes involve organizational operations and systems that 
may adversely affect individuals, supervisory or organizational performances 
(Mazaheri et al., 2015; M. Zhang et al., 2019). Emergency preparedness is an integral 
factor of the organizational factors in the proposed HFACS-MCTAI model. It involves 
emergency response training (Danial et al., 2018; Danial, Smith, Khan, et al., 2019a)  
of crews and ensures the presence of life jackets, lifeboats, alarms, and visual aids 






al., 2019). The lack of emergency preparedness can cause a severe safety hazard 
during operations in ice-covered waters. 
5.2.1.5 EXTERNAL FACTORS 
Reinach and Viale (2006), proposed an HFACS-RR model in which the authors 
introduced the fifth layer, external factors to the original model. The authors believed 
that the identification of accident risk factors should also consider the economy and 
law policies as supplements in the HFACS (M. Zhang et al., 2019). 
(M. Zhang et al., 2019) introduced legislation gaps, administrative oversights, and 
design flaws to the fifth layer in their model HFACS-SIBCI. The authors explain that 
legislation gaps involve differences between international and national navigation 
regulations and policies related to navigation in ice-covered waters. These gaps affect 
operations under icebreaker escort that may cause poor management or unsafe acts of 
operators. Administrative oversights involve the negligence of duties by the shipping 
companies and ship officers. The authors also mentioned design flaws of ships that 
are usually related to the flawed ability of icebreakers and their assisted ships during 
icebreaker escorts.   
The newly introduced classification category of economic pressures  to the layer 
external factors in the model plays an important role in maritime accidents because 
tight economic pressures on  shipping companies can increase the probability of risk-
taking, for instance, making tight schedules which leads taking risks (Rothblum, 
2000). It replaces the classification category of social factors in the original HFACS 






acts⎯in the function of the condition of operators i.e. fatigue (see Table 5.1) and 
personal factors i.e. inadequate communication and coordination (see Table 5.1), 
therefore, in order to remove redundancy in the model, social factors have been 
replaced with economic pressures in the layer external factors (see Figure 5.2).   
5.2.2 Identification and classification of accident risk factors in the 
HFACS-MCTAI model 
In the present section, we first identify accident risk factors for the marine convoy 
traffic in ice-covered waters on the basis of the five-layer HFACS-MCTAI model 
(Figure 5.2) proposed in section 5.2.1. Later, we classify risk factors on the basis of 
21 classification categories of the proposed HFACS-MCTAI  as errors, violations, 
technical faults, and so on (see Table 5.1). 
5.2.2.1 IDENTIFICATION AND CLASSIFICATION OF ACCIDENT RISK FACTORS  
Table 5.1 shows the identified risk factor with respective description and 
classification according to the HFACS-MCTAI model. Risk factors in the proposed 
study have been classified according to the description of 21 classification categories 
of the proposed HFACS-MCTAI. These classification categories are described in 
section 5.2.1. Seven risk factors are identified as unsafe acts of operators (B. Khan et 
al., 2018; National Research Council, 1990; Rothblum, 2000; M. Zhang et al., 2019). 
Fifteen risk factors are identified as preconditions of unsafe acts (B. Khan et al., 2018; 
F. Khan et al., 2014; Rothblum, 2000). Five risk factors are identified as unsafe 






Table 5.1. Description and Classification of accident risk factors during a convoy in ice-
covered waters 
Risk Levels Risk Factors Description  Classification 
Unsafe Acts Judgment 
Failures 
Failure to judge unsafe situations, 
especially related to the maintained 
distance, speed and emergency situations 





Decisions based on  inadequate 
information (B. Khan et al., 2018). 
Decision-
Based Errors 
 Negligence Carelessness in taking necessary 
precautionary actions during emergencies 
or regular operations. 
Exceptional 
Violations 
 Loss of 
Situational 
Awareness 
Being unaware of the relevant 








Lack of knowledge of the proper use of 






Inadequate watch keeping in various 
locations and duties aboard the ship, for 
example, bridge and engine room. 
Exceptional 
Violations  
 Deficiency of 
Crew Attention 
The inadequate timely response of a crew 





for Unsafe Acts 
Extremely Low 
Temperatures 
In higher latitudes, extremely low 
temperatures can cause fog or snow or 
sometimes vessel icing that can cause a 
ship to collide with another ship/object or 




 Fog Can cause poor visibility. Physical 
Environment, 
Weather 
 Darkness In higher latitudes, long polar nights can 




 Poor Visibility Poor visibility due to fog and snow can 

















Risk Levels Risk Factors Description  Classification 
 Types of Ice Presence of new ice, thick first-year ice, 
old ice, ice floes, fast ice, level ice, drift 
ice, and deforming ice is significantly 
hazardous for navigation in ice-covered 
waters (ABS advisory, 2009; Canadian 






The relative amount of area covered by 
ice. It is typically reported in terms of 
percentage. 0% means there is no ice, 
while 100% means the region is 




 Ice Strength The ice thickness and types account for ice 
strengthening in the sea and are 
considered the most common factors of 




 Ice Drift Drifting ice is a major threat to vessel 








Inadequate communication and 
coordination between crew members of a 
ship, crew members and the master of a 
ship, ship to ship during a convoy, ship to 
icebreaker during a convoy, and ship to 
Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) onboard 









Crew reductions can result in the neglect 
of essential maintenance (National 





Engine failure of icebreaker or any other 
ship in a convoy, steering gear failure, 
anti-collision system failure, failure of the 
communication equipment (M. Zhang et 
al., 2019) between the icebreaker and any 





Inadequate availability of precise, written, 
and comprehensible operational 
procedures (Rothblum, 2000), ice and 
navigational charts. Ineffectiveness of 
radar and radio communication, and 
inadequate navigational  searchlights (B. 
Khan et al., 2018). 
Technical 
Faults 
 Fatigue Poor maintenance, navigational and 
mechanical failures, lack of sleep, and 









maintain a safe 
speed in Ice 
The speed of an icebreaker or the ships in 









Risk Levels Risk Factors Description  Classification 
hazard during 
a convoy 
 Failure to 
maintain a safe 
distance between 
2 ships during a 
convoy 
The distance between the two ships in a 
convoy is shorter than the recommended 
standards causing an unsafe collision risk 






 Failure to 
maintain a safe 
distance between 
an icebreaker 
and a leading 
ship of a convoy  
The distance between the icebreaker and a 
leading ship of a convoy is shorter than the 
recommended standards causing an unsafe 
distance between the icebreaker and a 






 Failure to 
continue a safe 
operation in Ice 
The improper route design makes it hard 




 Inadequate route 
selection 
Improper route selection for a convoy in 
ice-covered waters can cause a ship-ice or 
icebreaker-ice collision during a convoy 







 Management practices such as 
maintenance, training schedule, and crew 
reduction (National Research Council, 
1990) can cause a severe safety hazard if 
not handled appropriately. 
Safety Culture 
 Crew Reduction Crew reduction can cause the crew to be 
overloaded; this can result in the lack of 
attention of crew aboard that negatively 
affects the safety of the ship or its crew 





Crew reduction can cause the crew to be 
overloaded; this can result in the lack of 
attention of crew aboard that negatively 
affects the safety of the ship or its crew 
(National Research Council, 1990). 
Resource 
Management 
 Lack of Training Improper management practices involve 
gaps in training 
Safety Culture 
 Maintenance  Improper management practices involve 
improper maintenance  
Safety Culture 
 Schedules  Faulty management practices and policies 
encourage risk-taking i.e. to meet the 
schedules at all costs (Rothblum, 2000). 
Safety Culture 
 Risk Taking Negative attitudes of organization towards 
safety, and faulty management practices 
and policies encourage Risk Taking i.e. to 








Risk Levels Risk Factors Description  Classification 
 Lack of 
Emergency 
Preparedness 
Lack of emergency training in the 
icebreaker and its assisted ships in a 







Tight economic pressures can cause 
unsafe situations during operations. 
Economic 
Factors 
 Faulty Company 
Policies and 
Standards 
Faulty management practices and policies 
encourage risk-taking i.e. to meet the 
schedules at all costs (Rothblum, 2000). 
Administrative 
Oversights 
 Design Flaws (1) Icebreaker or any other ship in a 
convoy does not have enough capacity to 
cope-up  with  the existing ice 
environment in the region, (2) icebreaker 
or any other assisted ship in a convoy has 
a lack of engine power, and (3) no 
combined ship collision avoidance rule 
exists during icebreaker assistance, which 
can result in risk of collision during a 
convoy (M. Zhang et al., 2019). 
Design Flaws 
 
organizational factors (National Research Council, 1990; M. Zhang et al., 2019), and 
three risk factors are identified as external factors (Rothblum, 2000) respectively (see 
Table 5.1). 
5.2.3 Development of the cause-consequence relationship among the 
accident risk factors 
This section explains how the risk factors considered in the HFACS-MCTAI model 
per layer contribute to a consequence or effect. A BN model (Figure 5.3) for unsafe 
acts considers the relevant risk factors as input nodes and estimates the probability of 
occurrence of unsafe acts as a function of the risk factors. Similarly, BN models for 
precondition of unsafe acts, unsafe supervision, organizational factors, and external 
factors have been constructed and presented in Figures 5.4-5.7 respectively. Interested 






2019; F. Khan et al., 2014; Mazaheri et al., 2015; National Research Council, 1990; 
Rothblum, 2000; Sahin & Kum, 2015; M. Zhang et al., 2019) to understand the 
relationships among the risk factors considered in the BNs. Some of the prior 
probabilities have been taken from earlier studies (B. Khan et al., 2019; F. Khan et 
al., 2014; Rothblum, 2000). The software package GiNIe 2.2 (BayesFusion, 2018) is 
used for the construction of the BNs.  
5.2.4 Estimation of accident probabilities during a convoy in ice-
covered waters – winter navigation of the marine convoy traffic on the St. 
Lawrence seaway  
The St. Lawrence Seaway (Figure 5.8) allows vessels to travel from the Atlantic 
Ocean to the great lakes of North America. The seaway named Saint Lawrence River, 
flows from Lake Ontario to the Gulf of St. Lawrence, Atlantic ocean. The river is 
officially extended from Montreal, Quebec to Lake Erie. The navigation season on 
the river extends from late March to late December. Ice begins to form in the river 
during the first half of December between Montreal and Quebec city. The combination 
of river currents and winds produces new ice to grow and spread along the south shore 
of the river. Ice in the region, typically grows to 20 to 60 centimeters in winters, while 
ridging, rafting, and hammocking can significantly increase these thicknesses. Ice 
floes in the region are thick and large (up to eight km or more), they are uneven and 
discolored and are easy to identify. Masters are advised to avoid them, as they are the 






The shipping channels are mostly congested by ice in winter, this is due to the ice 
removed from the banks to which it is attached (Canadian Coast Guard, 2012a). For 
such reasons, the icebreaker assistance operation is sometimes necessary to continue 
maneuvers on the river.  
Here we assume that an icebreaker assistance convoy operation is comprised of five 
vessels (oil tankers and bulk carriers) transiting the St. Lawrence Seaway. First, we 
estimate the accident probabilities of unsafe acts, preconditions of unsafe acts, unsafe 
supervision, organizational factors, and external factors that are earlier identified and 
classified on the basis of the proposed HFACS-MCTAI (see section 5.2.1), and then 
calculate the critical density of the traffic flow in the channel (see Tables 5.2 and 5.3, 
and Figures 5.9 and 5.10). 
 



















Figure 5.6. Cause-Consequence relationship between the risk factors for Organizational 
Factors. 
 








Table 5.2. Estimated accident probabilities of marine convoy traffic on the St. Lawrence 
Seaway 
Risk Factors Estimated Probabilities 
Unsafe Acts 0.10 
Preconditions for Unsafe Acts 0.11 
Unsafe Supervision 0.02 
Organizational Factors 0.01 
External Factors 0.07 
Ship-ice Collision  0.02 
Collision between two ships 0.04 
Collision between an icebreaker and the 
leading ship of a convoy 
0.04 
 
Table 5.3. Estimation of critical densities 𝜌𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 of marine convoy traffic on the 
St. Lawrence seaway with respect to the varied maximum velocities 𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥 and deceleration 
probabilities 𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛. 
Maximum Velocity Deceleration Probability Critical Density 
𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥 
(ship/timestep) 
𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝜌𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦  
(ship/site) 
3 0.01 0.25 
3 0.10 0.22 
3 0.30 0.18 
5 0.02 0.18 
5 0.24 0.12 
5 0.30 0.10 
 






5.2.4.1 PROBABILITY ESTIMATION 
Table 5.2 shows the estimated accident probabilities of unsafe acts, preconditions for 
unsafe acts, unsafe supervision, organizational factors, and external factors for marine 
convoy traffic on the St. Lawrence Seaway that have been calculated from Figures 
5.3 to 5.7. Since, in the present study, we have attempted to model human errors and 
the quantification of human errors in maritime risk assessment perspective is 
relatively difficult. For such reason, some of the prior values  of human errors that 
have been used in the study are based on assumptions, while some have been taken 
from the earlier studies (B. Khan et al., 2018, 2019; F. Khan et al., 2014; Rothblum, 
2000). Therefore, the magnitude of the estimated posterior probabilities presented in 
Table 5.2 are significantly variable. In the BN of unsafe acts, all risk factors are 
Boolean variables that take values from the set {Yes, No}.  
In the BN for preconditions of unsafe acts, the node ice strength takes values from the 
set {High, Medium, Low}, the node types of ice takes values from the set {New Ice 
(NI), Fast Ice (FI), Ice Floes (IF), Ice Ridge (IR)}, however, the remaining nodes are 
all Boolean.  BN for unsafe supervision contains all Boolean nodes, and takes values 
from the set {Yes, No}. The node Management Practices in the BN for organizational 
factors takes values from the set {Inappropriate, Appropriate}, the node Maintenance 
takes values from the set {Proper, Improper}, the node Scheduling takes values from 
the set {Tight, Relaxing}, and the node Organizational factors takes values from the 
set {Present, Absent}. The remaining nodes take values from the set {Yes, No}. The 






{Present, Absent}, while, all other nodes of the BN are Boolean, taking values from 
the set {Yes, No}. 
5.2.4.2 CRITICAL DENSITY ESTIMATION 
The present section adopts the Cellular Automata (CA) technique called the Nagel 
and Schreckenberg (NaSch) model (1992) for critical density estimation.  NaSch 
model is one of the most widely used cellular automata theory based traffic model. 
This model is selected in the present study due to its relevance to simulate covey 
traffic scenarios. 
The primary purpose of using NaSch model is  to  (a) estimate the critical density of 
the convoy traffic to avoid sudden traffic jams and collisions in ice-covered waters, 
(b) simulate scenarios of safe distance between two ships of the convoy and between 
the leading ship of a convoy and icebreaker, and (c) to integrate HFACS-MCTAI  
which helps to study the effects of unsafe acts, preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe 
supervision, organizational factors, and external factors on critical density, 
deceleration probability, the maximum velocity of the system and the sudden traffic 
jam during  a convoy in ice-covered waters. Wright (2013), in his article describes the 
global density ρ and global flow J(ρ). The NaSch model, with a little updating in the 
rules, can also be used for maritime traffic flow (B. Khan et al., 2019; Qi et al., 2017a). 
This section presents the  𝜌𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 estimation of a marine convoy traffic flow 
on the St. Lawrence Seaway using an updated NaSch model (B. Khan et al., 2019). 
For such a purpose, we take a shipping channel in the St. Lawrence Seaway of the 






L = 225.6m.  We use 200 iterations, i.e., Te = 200, where each Te is approximately 1 
sec (an approximation of the response time of a ship operator). Values of  𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥 have 
been selected randomly as 3 and 5, and values of  𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 have been selected 
randomly from the range 0.01-0.30. The reason for doing so is to see the behavior of 
the flow at random values of 𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥   and 𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 in the system. The results of the 
simulation (Figure 5.9) show that the 𝜌𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 of the flow decreases with the 
increasing values  of 𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥 and   𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 respectively (see the values of 
𝜌𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 with respect to 𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥 and   𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 in Table 5.3).  Increasing 𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥 
and  𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 cause the maximum flow and mean velocity of the system to 
collapse at lower densities, leading to sudden traffic jams and possible collision 
accidents in the region. In Figure 5.9, the value pointed to by the arrows are the 
estimated critical densities of the marine convoy traffic on the St. Lawrence Seaway. 
5.2.5 Integrated Accident Model (IAM) for Marine Convoy Traffic in Ice-
covered Waters 
Since 𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is a stochastic component introduced in the NaSch model by the 
process of randomization, it induces a non-deterministic motion of vehicles due to 
operators’ behavior (Nagel & Schreckenberg, 1992; Wright, 2013). Khan et al. (2019) 
proposed the updated version of  the NaSch model in which, including the process of 
randomization, all the rules of road traffic are updated with respect to the marine 
convoy traffic in ice-covered waters. Here we integrate the HFACS-MCTAI model 
with the updated NaSch model. The model is also extended to observe the effects of 






sudden traffic jam during a convoy in ice-covered waters. The model estimates the 
accident probabilities of  collision between two ships, ship-ice collision and collision 
between an icebreaker and the leading ship in a convoy. The integration takes place 
through BN (Figure 5.10). The resulting model is called the Integrated Accident 
Model (IAM) for Marine Convoy Traffic in Ice-covered Waters. 
The nodes in the model are Boolean. The nodes 𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛,𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥, and 𝜌𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 
take values from the set {High, Low}, while the nodes sudden traffic jam, collision 
between two ships, ship-ice collision, and collision between an icebreaker and the 
leading ship in a convoy take values from the set {Yes, No}respectively. 
 
Figure 5.9. Simulation results of marine convoy traffic on the St. Lawrence Seaway using 
updated NaSch model with 𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 0.02, 𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 5, 𝑛 = 200, and 𝑇𝑒 = 200 (a) Mean 






5.3 Results and Discussion  
The hypothetical case study illustrates that precondition of unsafe acts plays the most 
frequent role in the accidents during a convoy on the St. Lawrence Seaway, while 
unsafe acts stands second, followed by external factors, unsafe supervision, and 
organizational factors (Table 5.2). The results agree with the results of (M. Zhang et 
al., 2019). Table 5.3 presents the values estimated through the updated NaSch model 
for the critical density of a marine convoy on the St. Lawrence Seaway. The accident 
probabilities of ship-ice collision, collision between two ships in a convoy, and 
collision between an icebreaker and the leading ship of a convoy,  that are computed 
by using the IAM model are also given in Table 5.2. 
 
 






Table 5.4. Percent contribution of the accident risk factors on Unsafe Acts of Operators 
during a convoy on the St. Lawrence Seaway 
Ranking Risk factors in BN of Unsafe Acts Effect of the risk factors  on Unsafe Acts 
(% contribution sensitivity analysis) 
1 Inadequate General Technical Knowledge 27.00 
2 Inadequate Decisions 26.60 
3 Improper Lookouts 24.40 
4 Deficiency of Crew Attention 14.10 
5 Judgment Failure 7.400 
6 Negligence 7.300 
7 Loss of Situational Awareness 3.300 
 
Table 5.5. Percentage of contribution of the risk factors on Precondition for Unsafe Acts 
during a convoy on the St. Lawrence Seaway 
Ranking Risk factors Effect risk factors  on Precondition for  Unsafe 
Acts (Percent contribution sensitivity analysis) 
1 Ice Concentration 25.60 
2 Extreme Low Temperatures 23.60 
3 Ice 22.50 
4 Fatigue 21.30 
5 Blowing Snow 14.70 
6 Ice Drift 14.60 
7 Darkness 14.00 
8 Fog 13.90 
9 Inadequate Communication and 
Coordination 
11.20 
10 Poor Maintenance, Mechanical 
Failure, Navigational Failure  
5.500 
11 Ice Strength 3.700 
 
Table 5.6. Percentage of contribution of the risk factors on Unsafe Supervision during a 
convoy on the St. Lawrence Seaway 
Ranking Risk factors  Effect of the risk factors  on Unsafe 
Supervision (Percent contribution 
sensitivity analysis) 
1 Inadequate Route Selection 25.70 
2 Failure to continue a safe Operation in Ice 24.80 
3 Failure to continue a safe distance in Ice 13.40 
4 Failure to maintain a safe distance between 
two ships and  failure to maintain a safe 
distance between an icebreaker and a leading 









Table 5.7. Percentage of contribution of the risk factors on Organizational Factors during a 
convoy on the St. Lawrence Seaway 
Ranking Risk factors Effect of the risk factors on Organizational 
Factors (% contribution sensitivity analysis) 
1 Lack of Emergency Preparedness 25.70 
2 Risk Taking 23.40 
3 Management Practices 6.900 
4 Crew Overloaded 6.100 
5 Lack of Training, Maintenance, and 
Scheduling  
5.700 
Table 5.8. Percentage of contribution of the risk factors on Extra Factors during a convoy 
on the St. Lawrence Seaway 
Ranking Risk factors  
 
Effect of the risk factors  on Extra 
Factors (% contribution sensitivity 
analysis) 
1 Design Error 30.30 
2 Faulty Company Policies and Standards 28.90 
3 Tight Economic Pressures 27.70 
Table 5.9. Failure probabilities of the nodes and their effect on accident probabilities  during 
a convoy on the St. Lawrence Seaway 
Ranking Nodes Failure  
Probabilities 
Effect of the nodes on accident 
probabilities (Percentage of 
contribution sensitivity 
analysis) 
1 Sudden Traffic Jam  0.06 65.90 
2 Critical Density 0.06 (Low) 64.60 
3 Deceleration Probability 0.03 (High) 37.80 
3 Maximum Velocity  0.05 (High) 37.80 
4 Organizational Factors  0.01 (Present) 13.20 
5 Unsafe Supervision 0.02 12.90 
5 External Factors 0.07 12.90 
6 Unsafe Acts 0.10 12.80 
6 Precondition of Unsafe Acts 0.11 12.80 
5.3.1 Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity analysis is performed to determine the percentage contribution of accident 
risk factors for those listed in the risk levels of unsafe acts, precondition of unsafe 
acts, unsafe supervision, organizational factors, and external factors (see Tables 5.4 
to 5.8). This section also shows the failure probabilities of unsafe acts, precondition 






deceleration probability, maximum velocity, critical density, sudden traffic jam, and 
their contribution percentage to the accident probabilities in a convoy on the St. 
Lawrence Seaway (see Table 5.9). 
Table 5.4 shows that inadequate general technical knowledge, inadequate decision, 
improper lookouts, and deficiency of crew attention have the greatest impact on 
unsafe acts of operators. Table 5.5 shows that ice concentration, extreme low 
temperatures, ice, fatigue, blowing snow, ice drift, darkness, fog, and inadequate 
communication influence the preconditions for unsafe acts during a convoy. However, 
25% contribution each of poor maintenance, mechanical failures, and navigational 
failures can cause fatigue during a convoy. 
Table 5.6 shows that inadequate route selection, failure to continue a safe operation 
in ice, and failure to maintain a safe distance in ice have played the greatest role in 
unsafe supervision during a convoy. Table 5.7 shows that lack of emergency 
preparedness and risk taking have diminished the role of organizational factors during 
a convoy, while around 27% contribution of management practices, 24% contribution 
of crew overloaded, 22% contribution of lack of training, maintenance and scheduling 
and about 17% contribution of crew reduction in risk taking make the situation worse 
during the convoying. Table 5.8 shows that design error, faulty company policies and 
standards, and tight economic pressures have a major impact on External Factors 
during a convoy on the St. Lawrence Seaway. 
Table 5.9 shows the failure probabilities of the nodes and their effects on accident 






deceleration probability, and maximum velocity have a major influence on accident 
probabilities in convoying on the St. Lawrence Seaway. Moreover, the analysis shows 
that around 19% of the organizational factors, 18% contribution of unsafe supervision 
and external factors, and 18% contribution of unsafe acts and precondition of unsafe 
acts in  deceleration probability, maximum velocity, critical density, and sudden traffic 
jam can further increase the accident probabilities during the convoying. 
5.4 Conclusions  
This study proposed two models, both of which have been applied to a convoy 
navigating through St. Lawrence Seaway. The first model, HFACS-MCTAI, is used 
to identify and classify the contributing risk factors during a convoy in ice-covered 
waters. In the present study, we have also developed the cause-consequence 
relationships between the risk factors of the model. The relationships have been 
developed through a BN. The main purpose of developing the cause-consequence 
relation is to estimate the accident probabilities of the risk factors, and also to 
investigate the most frequently occurring risk factor in a convoy. The model, along 
with the BN of risk factors (which developed a cause-consequence relationship), 
when applied on the St. Lawrence Seaway, demonstrated that preconditions for unsafe 
acts are the most frequent contributing risk factor. This conclusion is based on the 
highest probability of occurrence (see Table 5.2) during a convoy on the St. Lawrence 
Seaway followed by unsafe acts, external factors, unsafe supervision, and 






The second model is the IAM model. This model is an extension of the earlier model 
proposed by the authors in the work of (B. Khan et al., 2019). The extension is 
conceived in terms of integration of an updated NaSch model with an HFACS-MCTAI 
model. This integrated model considers an operator’s behaviour and links it with the 
occurrence of various risk factors during a convoy, such as the physical environment, 
technical faults, organizational, and external factors identified and classified through 
HFACS-MCTAI. The IAM model is innovative: it aims to estimate the effects of 
unsafe acts, preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe supervision, organizational factors, 
and external factors on maximum velocity, deceleration probability, critical density, 
and sudden traffic jam during a convoy. IAM also estimates the accident probabilities 
of ship-ice collision, collision between two ships, and collision between an icebreaker 
and the leading ship of a convoy in ice-covered waters.  
The present study estimated the critical density of a convoy needed to avoid sudden 
jams and collisions during a convoy on the St. Lawrence Seaway. The study also 
demonstrated that sudden traffic jam, critical density, deceleration probability,  and 
maximum velocity greatly influence the accident probabilities. 
The proposed method is used to identify the contributing risk factors that can help in 
preventing accidents during a convoy in ice-covered waters. The methodology is also 
useful in route identification and selection during a convoy. This study introduces two 
new risk factors: crew reduction, and crew overloaded, in the risk layer of 
organizational factors. These risk factors do not directly influence the accident 
probability of organizational factors. However, a small increase in these factors 






analysis, it is determined that about a 17% contribution of crew reduction and about 
a 24% of contribution of crew overloaded increase the contribution of risk taking by 
an amount of approximately 93% in the overall risk of accidents. The accident 
probabilities obtained through the integrated model will be helpful in decision making 
concerning safe operations during a convoy in ice-covered waters. To obtain reliable 
results, it is necessary to have reliable prior beliefs for BNs. 1n the present study, we 
have attempted to model human errors. The quantification of human error is a 
challenging job, especially in a maritime risk assessment context. Therefore, some of 
the values that have been used in the study are based on assumptions. The collection 
of near-miss data and human error data similar to that collected in the aviation domain 
would be helpful in generating reliable prior beliefs in future. Nevertheless, the 
proposed models can be useful in developing a collision monitoring system that 
provides a real-time estimate of collision probabilities. 
In the present study, the validity of the proposed models has checked on the St. 
Lawrence Seaway Sea. However, with the little modification in the changing sea-ice 
and weather related conditions, the model can be applied to the other routes of the 
Arctic waters, for instance, the route from Murmansk to China, Vilkitskii strait, and 
the routes of Barents Sea.  
The present study can also be extended by using the evidential reasoning method and 
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Chapter 6  
Conclusions & Recommendations  
6.1 Conclusions  
This research presents conceptual models for understanding, examining, and applying 
the requirements demanded in the content of existing accident modeling standards in 
the maritime domain. Arctic navigation has many complexities and discrepancies than 
regular navigation because of its icy waters, cold temperatures, snow-storms, and low 
visibility due to fog, blowing snow, and long polar nights. One of the main 
contributions of this thesis is the identification of the risk factors related to Arctic 
navigation and develop the probabilistic-framework tools to assess the risk of ship-
ice collision during the independent navigation and the risk of ship-
ice/ship/icebreaker collision during a convoy in the region. BN technique has been 
generally used in this thesis to model ship-ice and ship-ship/icebreaker collisions. The 
main purpose of these models is not only estimating the collision probabilities but 
also to determine the causal relationships between the risk factors and their influence 
on collision probability. The key benefits of using BN models are, (1) it makes 
predictions with incomplete data, (2) combine subjective beliefs with objective data, 
(3) update previous beliefs in the light of new pieces of evidence, (4) Both forward 
and backward inferences are possible, (5) elicitation of probabilities and explaining 
model results are easier and simpler, (6) it can combine the experimental data with 
subjective beliefs, and (7) its ability to interconnect arguments effectively. All the 
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above mentioned benefits of BN modeling, all together with the specific 
quantification of uncertainties make BNs an effective and compelling solution for 
many types of risk assessment problems. 
Besides, the current thesis also presents the updated Nagel-Schrekenberg (NaSch) 
model and the HFACS-Marine Convoy Traffic in Ice-covered waters (HFACS-
MCTAI) in conjunction with BN. To check the model sensitivity and the sensitivity 
of model parameters (associated risk factors), sensitivity, and uncertainty analyses 
have also been performed in this study.  
The present research is divided into two parts: (1) risk-based collision modeling for 
the independent navigation and (2) risk-based collision modeling for the convoy 
traffic in the Arctic. For the independent navigation, we have merely used BN 
techniques to model the risk-based scenarios of the ship-ice collision, however, for 
the convoy traffic, we have used the updated NaSch and HFACS-MCTAI models with 
BNs to model the risk-based scenarios of the ship- ice/ship/icebreaker collisions.   
Initially, for the independent navigation, we have identified certain risk factors and 
constitute OOBN models namely, (1) Ship Navigational System states, (2) Ship 
Operational System states, (3) Ice States, (4) the Weather States, and (6) Human error. 
Later, we integrate all such models to construct a ship-ice collision model to estimate 
the collision probability. While the main purpose to use the OOBN methodology in 
the present research is to decompose a large network into small components so that it 
is easy to comprehend the visual representation of risk factors. Also, OOBNs are 
advantageous in such a way that they simplify the marine accident modeling through 
hierarchical and component-by-component analysis. The OOBN models can be 
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expanded for new components without affecting the existing components in the 
models, they are also useful to identify the root causes of an accident and analyze 
them individually.  
The OOBN/BN does not account for time dependence; therefore, a study has been 
extended by employing the DBN technique to the risk-based scenario of ship-ice 
collision. The main purpose of generating the DBN model of the ship-ice collision 
scenario is to support the operational and navigational decisions while navigating on 
the Arctic waters in connection with time.  Such time-oriented decisions are more 
vigorous in reducing collision risks in the region. DBN methodology in maritime risk 
analysis studies is beneficial because it reduces the computational complexities by 
making the risk factors time-dependent, the methodology also provides support to 
decision making where data is not clear.  
For convoy traffic, this research presents an updated NaSch model, the CA-based 
technique in conjunction with BN. The NaSch model provides a new perspective on 
the dynamics of Arctic navigation. The model simplifies maritime accident modeling 
by developing a practical understanding of the role of macroscopic properties i.e. 
critical density, deceleration probability, and maximum velocity of the traffic flow in 
maritime convoys to avoid collisions and sudden traffic jams.  The model presents the 
concepts of randomization and ship domain in a convoy. The model is useful in 
estimating the critical densities, while the model simulation shows that lower values 
of critical density result in sudden traffic jams and collisions, however, higher values 
of critical densities avoid sudden jams and collisions in the convoy. The model relates 
the non-deterministic motion of vehicles in a convoy with operators’ behavior. The 
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present research also identifies the main factors for convoy safety; (1) maintaining a 
safe distance between two ships, (2) maintain a safe speed in ice, (3) safe operations 
in ice, and (4) maintain a safe distance between an icebreaker and the leading ship of 
a convoy. The updated NaSch model is integrated with BN to see the effect of 
macroscopic properties on the main factors for convoy safety and estimate the 
collision probability in a convoy. The research also shows the influence of 
macroscopic properties of the convoy on collision probability.  
The research further extends and presents the Integrated Accident Model (IAM) for 
marine convoy traffic in ice-covered waters. For such purpose, HFACS-MCTAI has 
been proposed in which various contributory accidental risk factors have been 
identified and classified as unsafe acts, the precondition for unsafe acts, unsafe 
supervision, organizational factors, and external factors, respectively. The study 
proposes the HFACS-MCTAI model based on some changes made in the existing 
classification categories of the original HFACS model.  Later the cause-consequence 
relationship has also been developed among the risk factors that have been identified 
and classified through the HFACS-MCTAI model. The main purpose of developing 
the cause-consequence relationship is to estimate the accident probabilities of the risk 
factors and also to estimate the most frequently occurring risk factor in a convoy. 
Further, the HFACS-MCTAI model is combined with an updated NaSch model 
through BN to develop the IAM model. The IAM model is innovative, its main 
purpose is to extend the concept of an operator’s behavior in a convoy by adding the 
knowledge of various risk factors that are identified and classified through the 
HFACS-MCTAI model. Further, the model is also used to observe the effects of 
unsafe acts, the precondition for unsafe acts, unsafe supervision, organizational 
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factors, and external factors on deceleration probability, maximum velocity, critical 
density, and sudden traffic jam in a convoy navigating in ice-covered waters. The 
model is also used to estimate the collision probability between the two ships, ship 
and ice, and the icebreaker and the leading ship of a convoy. 
Nevertheless, the present study reveals that the human error such as decision-based 
on inadequate information, inadequate communication, and fatigue, the presence of 
high/moderate ice strength, poor visibility, and the high speed of the vessel are the 
most critical risk factors that are greatly responsible for ship-ice collision during the 
independent navigation in Arctic waters. The study also reveals that the lower critical 
densities with high deceleration probabilities and maximum velocities are wholly 
responsible for the failures of the main factors of convoy safety. A slight change in 
the values of macroscopic properties can significantly affect the factors and all these 
factors are equally sensitive for collision in a convoy. It is also observed in the study 
that the high densities along with the lower deceleration probabilities and velocities 
prevent the factors from failure and avoid sudden jams and collisions in a convoy. It 
is also revealed through this study that preconditions for unsafe acts are the most 
contributing risk factor occurring in a convoy, followed by unsafe acts, external 
factors, unsafe supervision, and organizational factors, respectively. The study also 
suggests that the estimation of the critical density of a convoy is always necessary to 
avoid sudden jams and collisions. Further, this study also introduces two new risk 
factors; (1) crew reduction, and (2) crew overloaded that do not directly influence the 
collision probability, however, a small increase in these factors greatly influence the 
risk of collision in a convoy.  
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6.2 Recommendations and future work  
The probabilities obtained through the proposed models can be used in decision 
making concerning safe operations in ice, for instance, maneuvering, route selection, 
towing, escorting, etc. The estimated probabilities are also helpful in the selection of 
a safe speed while navigating in Arctic waters. Also, the probabilities help investigate 
frequently occurring risk factors during independent navigation as well as in the 
convoy traffic. In this research, the proposed models are theoretical and conceptual, 
however, they can be useful in developing a collision monitoring system that provides 
a real time-estimate of collision probability in the future that could help avoid ship-
ice/ship/icebreaker collisions in the region.  
The estimated probabilities that are obtained through the integrated models can be 
useful in estimating critical densities, selection of appropriate deceleration 
probabilities, maintaining a safe speed, maintaining a safe distance between the 
icebreaker and the leading ship of a convoy, and maintaining a safe speed between 
the two ships of a convoy. In the future, the present study can be extended by 
calculating the ship domain i.e. the minimum safe distance between two ships 
according to the prevailing ice conditions in the waterways, harsh weather, and 
operational and navigational states of ships in convoys.  
In the present study, we have attempted to model human errors through BN, NaSch, 
and HFACS-MCTAI methodologies, though, the quantification of human error is a 
challenging job in a maritime risk assessment context. In the future, maritime 
authorities must collect near-miss and human error data similar to that collected in the 
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aviation domain to reduce the uncertainty component in maritime risk modeling. 
Uncertainty is an unavoidable component in any risk assessment procedure and the 
lack of data aggravates the difficulties. To reduce the uncertainties to some extent, the 
present study can also be extended by using the evidential reasoning method and 
Fuzzy set theory in combination with the proposed models.     
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